



Tibetan Crisis: Role Of Dalai Lama And Sino-Indian Relationships

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Abstract: The Tibetan Crisis, rooted in China's 1950 annexation of Tibet and the subsequent 1959 uprising, has significantly shaped Sino-Indian relations, with the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, playing a pivotal role as both a spiritual and political figure. Fleeing to India in 1959 after the failed Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama established the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, creating a government-in-exile that has been a persistent irritant in Sino-Indian diplomacy. This abstract explores the Dalai Lama's evolving role, from leading Tibet's resistance to advocating the Middle Way Approach for autonomy within China, and its implications for Sino-Indian relations. Initially, India's hosting of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees strained ties with China, contributing to tensions culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China's suspicion of Indian support for Tibetan activities, despite India's official stance limiting the Dalai Lama to religious and cultural roles, continues to fuel mistrust. The Dalai Lama's international advocacy, including his 1987 Five-Point Peace Plan and global travels, has amplified Tibet's cause, aligning it with Western support and complicating India's balancing act between supporting Tibetan exiles and managing relations with China. This research offers a structured historical and theoretical analysis of India-China relations, focusing on the Tibet issue and the Dalai Lama's influence from 1947 to the present. It employs international relations theories to contextualize the conflict and proposes pathways for peaceful resolution. The findings aim to contribute to understanding the geopolitical complexities of the Tibetan crisis and its impact on Sino-Indian relations, offering insights for future diplomatic strategies.

Index Terms - Tibetan Crisis, Sino-Indian War, Dalai Lama, Five-Point Peace Plan.

I. INTRODUCTION

The ties between India and China have deep historical roots extending into ancient times. Chinese pilgrims Fa-Hien and Hiuen Tsang visited India, with Hiuen Tsang notably studying at Nalanda University. India was the first non-communist country to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949 and also supported China's bid for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. India-China relations remained cordial between 1949 and 1956, and in 1954, it was announced that bilateral relations would be guided by the 'Panchsheel' agreement.

After gaining independence in 1949, China sought to safeguard its national interests by cultivating a form of nationalism independent of Western influence. The key pillars of this Chinese nationalism were: (a) rejection of all forms of hegemony; (b) equality and mutual respect; (c) preservation of national unity; and (d) restoration of historically lost territories. With these priorities in mind, China adapted its foreign policy in response to evolving geopolitical contexts.

China believes that the British colonial powers alienated several regions historically belonging to China. After gaining independence, China attempted to reclaim these territories. As part of this effort, China asserted its claim over Tibet and occupied the region in 1959. During this period, the Dalai Lama sought asylum in India, accompanied by approximately 85,000 Tibetan refugees. Currently, the global Tibetan refugee population stands at around 150,000 (Mahapatra, 2015).

Tibetans continue to advocate for India to recognize Tibet as an independent and sovereign nation. Since the Dalai Lama remains a vocal critic of China and enjoys diplomatic protection under international law, China maintains ongoing surveillance over his activities. This has further exacerbated the already complex border dispute between India and China. Recently, the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh and met the President of India - a move perceived by China as an Indian conspiracy, prompting strong diplomatic warnings from Beijing.

II. ISSUES RELATED TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Tensions between India and China persist over various issues, among which the Tibet issue remains one of the most sensitive and enduring points of contention. Since their respective independence, bilateral relations between the two countries have repeatedly intersected around the Tibet question. Consequently, Tibet serves as a significant benchmark in understanding the dynamics of India-China relations. Given its strategic and symbolic importance, it is essential to analyze the evolution of bilateral ties through the lens of the Tibet issue.

III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

India-China relations have experienced periodic deterioration, often taking new trajectories in the context of Tibet and the Dalai Lama. The issue has sparked debates at the international level and attracted scholarly attention. Numerous researchers have examined different dimensions of India-China relations, resulting in a range of articles, books, and journals on the subject.

In the edited volume *Bharater Bideshneeti o Samparker Gatiprakriti* by Biswanath Chakraborty and Debasish Nandy, Debasish Mahapatra contributes an essay titled “Bharat-Chin Koushalgata Samparka: Atit o Bartaman” (2015), where he analyzes China's policy of aggression. He particularly focuses on China's occupation of Tibet and the subsequent exodus of Tibetan refugees led by the Dalai Lama, along with India's role in granting them asylum. In addition to these observations, the essay also highlights areas of cooperation between India and China, particularly in commerce, defense, and research and development.

Shakti Mukhopadhyay and Indrani Mukhopadhyay, in their book *Antarjatic Samparka, Sangathan o Pararastra Neeti* (2010), outline the mutual commitment of India and China to the principles of the ‘Panchsheel’ agreement. However, they also highlight a number of persistent complexities that continue to strain bilateral relations.

From China's perspective:

- (a) China remains sceptical of India's ‘Look East Policy’, viewing it as a strategic attempt to counter Chinese influence in the Southeast Asian region;
- (b) China is uneasy about India's deepening diplomatic and strategic partnerships with Japan and Russia, which it perceives as efforts to encircle or balance Beijing;
- (c) China has also expressed strong reservations regarding the India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement, considering it a potential disruption to regional strategic parity;

(Mukhopadhyay & Mukhopadhyay, 2010).

From India's perspective:

- (a) India remains deeply uncomfortable with China's Tibet policy, and has consistently advocated for a peaceful resolution of the Tibetan issue, especially during the lifetime of the Dalai Lama;
- (b) China's continued military assistance and arms supply to Pakistan and Nepal are viewed by India as significant threats to its national security and regional stability;

(Mukhopadhyay & Mukhopadhyay, 2010).

Aneek Chattopadhyay, in his book *Thanda Yuddher Par Antarjatik Samparka* (2012), discusses the evolution of India-China relations from the pre-Cold War to the post-Cold War period. He emphasizes China's political apprehensions following the 1962 Indo-China War, particularly in relation to the Tibet issue. He also examines various subsequent agreements and conventions aimed at fostering diplomatic normalization between the two nations.

Biswaranjan Mohanty, in his work *Foreign Policy of India in the 21st Century* (2012), focuses primarily on the economic and commercial dimensions of India-China relations across different phases. However, he notes that economic cooperation alone cannot serve as the foundation for a robust bilateral relationship. He underscores this point by comparing it to India's commercial ties with Pakistan, a country traditionally regarded as India's principal adversary.

Aneek Chatterjee, in *Neighbours, Major Powers and Indian Foreign Policy* (2017), stresses the importance of political and economic cooperation, as well as military and cultural exchanges, in shaping India-China relations.

In the edited volume *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, Sumit Ganguly includes a contribution by John W. Garver titled "Evolution of India's China Policy" (2016), in which Garver explores the ideological conflicts that have characterized India-China relations since independence. He specifically addresses the Tibet issue and China's aggressive policies, noting that China has consistently viewed control over Tibet as essential to its strategy for asserting influence in regional and global power politics. According to Garver, China is unlikely to relinquish its claim over Tibet as doing so would undermine its geopolitical aspirations.

IV. RESEARCH GAP

The Tibet issue and the position of the Dalai Lama have emerged as significant and persistent challenges in India-China relations. Although a substantial body of research - including books, journal articles, and scholarly papers - exists on this subject, there remains a notable gap in the literature. Specifically, there has been no comprehensive or conclusive analysis outlining the exact role of Tibet and the Dalai Lama in shaping bilateral relations, nor has any work clearly articulated the root causes of the Tibetan problem or proposed a viable solution in this context. As a result, Tibet remains an under-explored yet crucial criterion for assessing India-China relations.

V. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In light of this discussion, the primary objective of this study is to critically examine the positions of India, China, and the Tibetan leadership, especially, that of the Dalai Lama on the Tibetan issue. It aims to assess the impact of the Tibet question on India-China relations and to explore the prospects for a peaceful resolution.

VI. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the existing discourse surrounding Tibet and the Dalai Lama, this study seeks to address the following key research questions:

- Why is China particularly focused on the Dalai Lama and the issue of Tibet, and what strategic or political concerns does it have when the Dalai Lama visits Arunachal Pradesh?
- How does the Tibetan issue influence the broader framework of India-China diplomatic and security relations?

VII. SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY

This research adopts a predominantly qualitative and conceptual approach. While both qualitative and quantitative methods are commonly employed in social science research, this study places primary emphasis on secondary sources, including academic books, peer-reviewed articles, official statements, and expert commentaries. The research is thus largely analytical and interpretive in nature, aiming to construct a

comprehensive understanding of the Tibet question through a synthesis of existing literature and theoretical insight.

VIII. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the study of international relations, theoretical frameworks are essential tools for analyzing and interpreting complex geopolitical events. They provide structured lenses through which the behavior of states and the nature of conflicts can be understood. The dynamics of India-China relations, particularly in the context of the Tibet issue, can be critically examined through several theoretical perspectives, notably Realism, Structural Realism, *Mandala Theory*, *Four-Fold Modes* and the theory of *Six Gunas*.

Realism: Following its liberation from colonial domination, China adopted a realist approach in its foreign policy. Realism, as a theory of international relations, posits that states operate in an anarchic international system and prioritize survival, power accumulation, and self-interest. In this context, China has continually sought to establish a balance of power to protect itself from other major global powers (Chakraborty & Nandy, 2014).

Structural Realism: From a structural realist perspective, China's rise as a global superpower is a strategic response to the inherently anarchic international structure. Structural Realism, or neorealism, emphasizes the distribution of power in the international system and the resulting security competition among states. Because the global order lacks a central authority and the risk of conflict is always present, China has prioritized the expansion of its military and economic capabilities to secure its position and influence (Chakraborty & Nandy, 2014).

Vijigishu, Bheda, Yana and Arimitra Strategies: China aspires to play the role of a 'Vijigishu' (the hegemonic leader of the *Mandala theory* by Kautilya) within the Asian continent. In pursuit of this objective, it has sought to extend its military and economic dominance across Asia. Through policies of 'Bheda'/strategic diversification (one of the *Four-Fold Modes* stated in Hindu Ethics), China aims to solidify its status as a global economic power (Pradhan, 2020). At the same time, it seeks to weaken its main regional rival, India, by covertly encouraging separatist movements, perpetuating India-Pakistan hostilities, and asserting territorial claims, such as its past claim over Sikkim. Historically, China has applied 'Yana'/aggressive postures (one of the *Four-Fold Modes* stated in Hindu Ethics) in its dealings with India, as seen in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China continues to issue warnings to India, particularly as it perceives itself as possessing greater military and financial strength. Furthermore, China has consistently applied the principle of 'Arimitra' (the third king of *Twelve Raja-Mandala*) which means "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" (Pradhan, 2020). With India as its primary rival and Pakistan as India's main adversary, China views Pakistan as a strategic ally, extending substantial military and economic assistance to counterbalance India's influence.

China's foreign policy has evolved over time based on shifting 'Grand Strategy' (Di, 2007). Under Mao Zedong, China adopted a belligerent and ideologically confrontational stance. However, during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a relatively pragmatic and cooperative approach emerged. In recent decades, China has returned to a more assertive and expansionist posture, presenting itself as an aggressive empire seeking to exert influence across Asia.

This theoretical framework, anchored in realism, structural realism, and the Strategies of Vijigishu, Bheda, Yana and Arimitra helps illuminate the underlying causes of tension in India-China relations, especially as they relate to Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and broader regional competition.

IX. HISTORY OF TIBET AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE DALAI LAMA

Geographically, Tibet has long served as a buffer state between India and China, making it a region of strategic interest to both nations. Historically, the mountain passes connecting India and Tibet facilitated Indo-Tibetan relations, and Indian culture and civilization significantly influenced Tibetan society. The arrival of Buddhism in the 9th century contributed to the establishment of a peaceful society in Tibet. However, this peaceful nature led Tibet to rely on external military powers for its internal and external security. Over the centuries, Mongol rule was established in Tibet during both the 13th and 18th centuries. Subsequently, China began intervening in Tibetan affairs, ostensibly to liberate Tibet from Mongol domination (Pokharna, 2009).

In 1774, Warren Hastings, the then Governor-General of British India, initiated diplomatic and commercial relations with Tibet. Later, in 1903-1904, Lord Curzon dispatched the Younghusband Mission, which resulted in the establishment of three trade marts at Yatung, Gartok, and Gyantse in the Chumbi Valley, along with the emergence of several border disputes. Subsequently, the Simla Convention (1914) involved negotiations among the Tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra, the Chinese representative Chen-I-Fen, and British India's representative Sir Henry McMahon. These negotiations aimed to secure recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and to formalize its status as a Chinese province. Nevertheless, Tibet continued to be governed by the Dalai Lama, and China remained dissatisfied with these arrangements (Pokharna, 2009).

Chinese interventions in Tibet persisted over time. During the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) and the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), China embraced Lamaist Buddhism and forged close ties with Tibetan lamas, who often served as advisers to the imperial courts. Following the Mongolian Dzungar invasion of Lhasa in 1717, Qing forces (Manchus) entered Tibet in 1719. By 1724, Tibet granted Chinese authorities military and administrative access, which further solidified Chinese control and raised questions about the Dalai Lama's political future. The Kuomintang regime that followed sought to formalize full Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (Pokharna, 2009).

X. INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS CENTERED ON TIBET AFTER INDIAN INDEPENDENCE

After India's independence in 1947, Tibet began to play a pivotal role in shaping India-China relations. At a London press conference in November 1949, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "*India had always recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but Tibet was considered as an autonomous unit and dealt with on that basis*" (Nehru, 1950). Even earlier, in September 1947, the Indian government assured Lhasa that all existing Indo-Tibetan treaties would remain valid (Norbu, 1997).

However, in 1950, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet, effectively initiating a process of annexation (Norbu, 1997). This prompted armed resistance in southeastern Tibet by 1956, with the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly providing training and support to the Tibetan resistance fighters. As the conflict intensified, Prime Minister Nehru adopted a sympathetic stance toward the Tibetan cause, granting political asylum to the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India (Garver, 2010).

In 1954, India and China signed the 'Panchsheel' agreement, which was intended to resolve border issues and establish the basis of peaceful coexistence. As part of this agreement, China reinforced its claim over Tibet as its historical right (Norbu, 1997). However, in 1959, China fully occupied Tibet, prompting the Dalai Lama to flee to India with a large number of Tibetan followers.

Between 1949 and 1962, India-China relations largely revolved around the Tibet issue. The situation reached a breaking point in 1962, when war broke out between the two nations over a border dispute. China achieved several objectives through this conflict:

1. To "educate" India diplomatically and militarily over the Tibet issue;
2. To undermine India's position on the boundary question;
3. To diminish India's leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement and among Third World nations;
4. To damage Nehru's reputation in global politics; (Chattopadhyay, 2012).

XI. POST-WAR (1962) DEVELOPMENTS AND BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

Following the 1962 war, India-China relations remained frozen throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Diplomatic relations were eventually restored in 1976, with Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visiting China. Despite this symbolic step, tangible progress remained limited.

In 1981, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India. During high-level discussions, both sides agreed that the border dispute would be resolved through bilateral dialogue at the 'government level'. This process gained momentum when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988. The two sides established a Joint Working Group (JWG) tasked with addressing the border issue through structured diplomatic channels (Chattopadhyay, 2012).

Further progress was made in the 1990s. During Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to China in 1993, both countries signed an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In 1996, several Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) were announced by both countries to reduce tensions and prevent border skirmishes, following a meeting of the Joint Working Group (Chattopadhyay, 2012).

XII. INDIA'S TIBET POLICY AND SINO-INDIAN DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

According to J. W. Garver, India's policy toward Tibet since independence has evolved through four distinct phases, reflecting shifting regional dynamics, strategic calculations, and global pressures:

1. 1947-1951: During this initial phase, New Delhi sought international recognition of the Tibetan government and attempted to dissuade Beijing from deploying military forces into Tibet.
2. 1954-1959: India pursued a moderate approach, proposing autonomy for Tibet within China and reducing its military presence in the Himalayan frontier.
3. 1962-1977: Following the Sino-Indian War and increased Chinese repression in Tibet, India supported the Tibetan resistance movement and attempted to mobilize international opposition to China's policies.
4. 1986-1999: India adopted a balanced diplomatic posture, carefully navigating Beijing's sensitivities while responding to international pressure on human rights in Tibet and formulating an official political stance on the issue (Pokharna, 2009).

During this same period, China intensified its control over Tibet by implementing repressive policies, including the destruction of Tibetan cultural institutions, widespread human rights violations, and the imposition of a secular, state-controlled education system. Numerous Tibetan monks and nuns were reportedly killed or imprisoned, and religious freedoms were severely restricted.

Despite the Dalai Lama's exile in India since 1959 and the absence of formal engagement with Beijing, Chinese authorities have at times considered the possibility of reconciliation, motivated by three primary factors:

- International pressure in support of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan autonomy;
- Strategic awareness within China of the enduring influence of the Dalai Lama;
- The transition from Maoist rigidity to Deng Xiaoping's era of reform, characterized by pragmatism and limited flexibility in foreign affairs; (Pokharna, 2009).

XIII. THE DALAI LAMA'S PEACE PROPOSALS AND EVOLVING POLITICAL POSITION

In 1987, during a speech in Washington, D.C., the Dalai Lama proposed five key principles for resolving the Tibetan conflict:

1. Establishing an atmosphere of nonviolence and peace throughout Tibet;
2. Ending the policy of large-scale Chinese migration into Tibet;
3. Guaranteeing basic human rights and democratic freedoms, including free elections;
4. Promoting denuclearization and environmental protection in the Tibetan Plateau;
5. Ensuring a sincere commitment to dialogue and compromise over Tibet's future; (Pokharna, 2009).

In 1988, the Dalai Lama elaborated his vision through the Strassburg Proposal, which did not seek full independence but proposed genuine autonomy for Tibet under Chinese sovereignty. His primary objective was the preservation of Tibetan religion, culture, and way of life. However, Beijing viewed this "middle way" as a direct threat to the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly on power in Tibet. The creation of a democratically elected legislature, an independent judiciary, and other autonomous institutions would undermine the Party's centralized control - an outcome Beijing perceived as politically untenable and potentially destabilizing (Pokharna, 2009).

In more recent years, according to an official of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Dalai Lama has further softened his stance - shifting away from demands related to political, economic, and diplomatic affairs, and instead advocating for the preservation of cultural and religious autonomy within the framework of the

Chinese Constitution. He has suggested a model similar to “one country, two systems”, as practiced in Hong Kong, where Tibet could maintain its internal distinctiveness while remaining under Chinese sovereignty (He & Sautman, 2005/2006).

XIV. TIBET AS A STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC FLASHPOINT

In reality, Tibet has become a central diplomatic issue in India-China relations. For China, the presence of the Dalai Lama in India is not merely symbolic but represents a serious challenge to its narrative of national unity. Tibet is not only culturally significant but also rich in natural resources, including water and minerals, making it strategically crucial to China’s economy and regional dominance.

India, in turn, has treated Tibet as a diplomatic leverage point, often responding to Chinese statements on Kashmir by drawing attention to human rights and autonomy issues in Tibet. The Dalai Lama has used India as a platform to promote international awareness and push for Tibet’s cultural and political rights. He has repeatedly urged the Indian government to support Tibet’s status as a distinct entity, if not as an independent state.

However, this complex dynamic took a new turn during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 2003 visit to China, when India formally recognized Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China. In exchange, China acknowledged Sikkim as an integral part of India - a strategic trade-off that signaled a temporary diplomatic understanding.

Nevertheless, China continues to suspect that the Dalai Lama is orchestrating anti-China activities from Indian soil, with tacit Indian support. In response, China has deepened its engagement with Pakistan, especially on Kashmir, as a counter-strategy to balance India's position on Tibet.

Thus, Tibet remains a persistent obstacle and a strategic chess piece in India-China relations, deeply entwined with national identity, regional security, and global diplomacy.

XV. CONCLUSION

While ideological differences have played a significant role in straining India-China relations, it is primarily geo-strategic factors that have driven the deterioration of bilateral ties since the early years of independence. These enduring strategic concerns have made the resolution of the border dispute between the two countries a long-standing and unresolved issue.

Following its liberation from colonial rule, China sought to project itself as a dominant economic and military power, both within Asia and globally. In doing so, it challenged India’s standing as a champion of the Non-Aligned Movement and sought to undermine India’s regional influence. This gave rise to China’s increasingly assertive and aggressive posture, aimed at curtailing India’s geopolitical prominence. To achieve this, China has forged military and economic partnerships with several South Asian countries, most notably Pakistan, offering substantial aid and military assistance with the strategic aim of counterbalancing India’s regional influence.

China has also demonstrated an intent to expand its territorial claims, further complicating its relationship with India. In 2012, China issued new e-passports depicting Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of its national territory (Mahapatra, 2015). China considers Arunachal Pradesh a part of ‘South Tibet’ and often refuses to issue visas to residents from the region. Furthermore, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs renamed six locations in Arunachal Pradesh in 2017, further intensifying tensions (Anandabazar Patrika, 2017). Additionally, China has reasserted claims over Sikkim, and its military incursion into the Doklam Plateau on Bhutanese territory triggered another episode of heightened India-China tensions.

China’s goal to make India strategically uncomfortable lies behind these actions. To achieve this, it has proposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through the disputed region of Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Simultaneously, China has strengthened its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean through the “String of Pearls” strategy - building maritime infrastructure in countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives - which India perceives as a direct threat to its maritime security.

Amidst these manoeuvres, the Tibet issue has evolved from a cultural and humanitarian concern into a pivotal strategic dispute. For China, Tibet represents both a strategic buffer zone and a region rich in natural resources vital to its economic interests. Consequently, Beijing is unwilling to compromise on its sovereignty over Tibet. The Chinese government views the Dalai Lama's continued presence in India as a political threat, believing that his death may eventually render the Tibetan issue obsolete. Conversely, India must strike a delicate balance, maintain its security interests while manage the complexities Tibet introduces into its bilateral relationship with China.

Despite the turbulence, there have been some positive developments in bilateral relations over the past three decades (1988-2017). In 1988, India and China signed a Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP), which was further expanded in 2010 during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India. The CEP emphasized people-to-people connections through exchanges involving artists, writers, naval delegations, media personnel, and cultural festivals (Chatterjee, 2017).

Both countries have increasingly relied on 'backchannel diplomacy' to manage bilateral tensions. For instance, during a border negotiation, China's chief negotiator Dai Bingguo emphasized that nothing is impossible when there is a will. He noted that if two countries commit to friendship, set aside enmity, and cooperate for peace, their peoples will experience significant improvement (Mahapatra, 2015). More recently, India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval visited Beijing to discuss border tensions (military standoff in Eastern Ladakh), signaling that dialogue remains open (The Hindu, 2024).

Ultimately, lasting peace between India and China will require more than governmental negotiations. There must be a concerted effort to strengthen public diplomacy, fostering understanding and cooperation between ordinary citizens on both sides. As long as the Tibet issue remains unresolved, it will continue to complicate the broader India-China border dispute. Therefore, resolving the Tibetan question is not only critical to regional stability but also essential for building a mutually beneficial and peaceful future for both nations.

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