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## Conflict Resolution In Darfur And Abyei

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The African Union has been granted enhanced jurisdiction to mediate conflicts in Darfur and Abyei, including inter-state and intra-state disputes, tackle ideological threats, and engage in peacebuilding initiatives. The AU Charter has strengthened the member states' ability to tackle conflict-related matters via collaborative efforts. According to Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of AU, the goals of the AU is to promote stability, security, and peace. Additionally, Article 4(e) of the AU stipulates that one of its core values is the nonviolent settlement of disputes between member nations. The African Union consistently and legitimately dispatches its Pan-African forces to regions experiencing armed hostilities. Over the years, the African Union (AU) has proved that it is committed to proactively managing and resolving violent disputes in Africa.

This article evaluates the AU's approach to avoiding, confining, and resolving interrelated violent crises inside and between African states. The analysis has primarily examined AU's involvement in resolving conflicts in Darfur and Abyei, taking into account the extended duration of armed conflicts in these two cases.

### **African State System**

Harrop in his book *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction* writes, “ The origins of the African state system can be traced back to the historical process of establishing states after the colonial era. The notion of the state began in Europe and was then spread to other regions of the world via the efforts of colonial powers, notably Britain, France, and Spain. Opello and Rosow contend that understanding contemporary states requires recognizing how European governments created a worldwide integrated system via the use of military conquest, commerce, religious conversion, and diplomatic relations (Rosow, 2004). As a result, the state was established despite the presence of pre-existing ethnic, regional, and religious

differences, which were made even stronger by the rigid classifications enforced by colonial powers” (Harrop, 1982).

Davidson contends that the post-colonial state in Africa may be characterized as the "black man's burden" instead of being seen as "Europe's last gift" to the continent (Davidson, 1992). 50% of its states has boundaries that include at least one linear segment, while many international borders are viewed with indifference by both governing bodies and citizens. Several areas lack any security measures, which does not reflect a state that prioritizes demonstrating its authority over its territory (Harrop, 1982).

Conversely, Elliott Green said that African countries are distinguished by their remarkable magnitude and their notoriety for possessing artificial borders that were created during the colonial period. Prior research has shown a connection between the dimensions and configuration of African nations and unfavourable development results. Contrarily, the author of this research contends that the dimensions and configuration of African nations are not arbitrary; rather, they are the result of Africa's low population before colonization. In this situation, regions characterized by a sparse population were merged to create unusually huge colonial territories with artificially defined boundaries. Moreover, he explained that there is a notable negative link between the size of a state and pre-colonial trade. Furthermore, it has been shown that commerce and population density are the predominant variables responsible for the majority of variations in the size of African states. In the end, he rejects the idea that there is any correlation between population density and the size or structure of nations in former colonies outside of Africa. This underscores the distinctiveness of the process involved in the establishment of modern African nations (Green, 2012).

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni employs the notion of 'coloniality of power' to examine the process of decolonization. He employs a 'colonial difference' framework to critically analyze the limitations of decolonization from the standpoint of African people who were previously subjected to colonialism. Three primary explanations are presented. The commemoration of the decolonization process as the paramount era in African history fails to acknowledge the persistent impact of colonial power structures in preserving Africa's subservient position in global politics. In addition, decolonisation alone resulted in the achievement of political and legal autonomy, a notion that is sometimes confused with the emancipation of the general population in Africa. Moreover, it is crucial to recognize that despite the celebrations around decolonization, regular African people swiftly became entangled in new struggles for self-governance. The purpose of these conflicts was to liberate themselves from the oppressive rule imposed by the post-colonial African government, which they inherited and were subjugated to (Gatsheni, 2012).

Sabelo examines the genealogical, philosophical, and ethical dimensions of decolonization, along with its political assumptions and consequences. This allows for the differentiation between the ideas of liberty and the ideas of liberation, which are sometimes considered to be interchangeable. Moreover, it permits a detailed examination of the traits of the post-colonial African state, which was thrust upon Africans without a full institutional reformation and decolonization process being fully completed. This essay provides a novel perspective on the ongoing endeavors of ordinary individuals to liberate themselves from the influence of

postcolonial regimes. The text focuses on the recent uprisings in North Africa against oppressive governments (Gatsheni, 2012) .

It delves deeper into the postcolonial situation in Africa, particularly examining the themes of the fight for freedom and the persistent issue of dependence (in terms of knowledge, culture, economy, and politics) resulting from colonialism and coloniality. By using a deep understanding of history, philosophy, and politics, as well as the core ideas of power dynamics, identity, and knowledge in colonial contexts, one may get a thorough and really enlightened understanding of the experiences of marginalized African populations. The author's study emphasizes the impact of worldwide imperial aspirations and the enduring presence of colonial power structures on the evolution of African social systems and their manipulation of social dynamics. This has led to a convoluted condition of immobility marked by a combination of postcolonial neo-colonization, when the principles of decolonization and liberty are eclipsed by myths and delusions (Gatsheni S. J., 2013).

The distinguishing feature of his work is in its emphasis on de-colonization, enabling a meticulous examination of the decolonization process, which is sometimes misconstrued as liberation. The paper also examines the intricate issue of African identity and offers a comprehensive analysis of how coloniality perpetuates the ongoing supremacy of Euro-American forces. Furthermore, it reveals the interdependence between the 'postcolonial' and 'neo-colonial' conundrum. The rise of the postcolonial African state as a powerful and oppressive entity takes place in a particular context, where the 'postcolonial' condition is marked by contradictions that are shaped by the dynamics of violence. The author substantiates his theoretical assertions with comprehensive empirical case studies carried out in DRC, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. (Gatsheni, 2013).

He seeks to elucidate the effects of colonialism on power relations, specifically a global system of neo-colonial dominating power that connects people and place, as well as race and labor, in service of capital's objectives and the interests of white Europeans. This has had a substantial impact on defining the complex history of the African postcolonial period. From his viewpoint, the current situation might be characterized as a contradictory "present" that seems "absent" since it does not correspond to the hopes and endeavours of Africans. Africans and their forefathers dreamed of a new society where everyone might live as equals and enjoy freedom after experiencing the harsher effects of modernity, such as the slave trade, mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid. African nationalism and decolonization were in direct opposition to the negative aspects of modernity, such as economic backwardness and the suppression of knowledge. Nevertheless, the process of decolonization did not result in the creation of a new society governed by progressive humanist principles like equality, freedom, social justice, and moral coexistence. African people discovered themselves living in a "postcolonial neo-colonized world" where illusions of independence and decolonization prevailed.

The phrase "postcolonial neo-colonized world" appropriately describes the challenges and remote possibility of complete decolonization in Africa, where the legacy of the colonial power structure and the demands of predatory international powers endure. The current global order is characterized by America occupying the highest position and Africa occupying the lowest place in the racial and capitalist hierarchies inside the international system. The slave trade, mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid were detrimental facets of European modernity that resulted in a multifaceted predicament for Africa. The situation led to the merging of the 'postcolonial' and 'neo-colonial' states, making it intellectually impossible to distinguish them as separate entities (Gatsheni, 2013).

The term 'postcolonial neo-colonized world' essentially describes a situation in which the processes of African nation-building, state-construction, knowledge production, economic development, and democratization have not reached their full potential because they are still confined within the modern global power structures that have their roots in the colonial era. African politicians are also limited by a dominant colonial power structure. Those who challenge the dominance of the strong Euro-American world and attempt to stray from it risk harsh repercussions, in some cases even intentional assassinations. Therefore, in the context of a world that has shifted from colonialism to a new form of colonization, various interconnected issues such as identity formation, the rise of nationalism, the process of decolonization, nation-building, the promotion of liberal democracy, the study of knowledge, and economic advancement must be analyzed together to fully understand the state of postcolonial Africa (Gatsheni, 2013).

### **African Security Environment**

refers to the overall conditions and factors that impact the security and stability of African nations and regions. The persistent and enduring security challenges in Africa, along with the numerous efforts to address them, have consistently influenced the interactions between African nations, their communities, and the global community in the post-colonial era (Alden, 2014). The fundamental concern in this scenario is to the condition of African nations and their susceptibilities, sometimes ascribed to the enduring consequences of colonialism and neo-colonial activities. Moreover, there exists a substantial disparity between the governing class and the varied communities they oversee. Additionally, these nations have obstacles such as widespread corruption and enduring mishandling of programs (Paul, 2011).

While there was some consideration given to the establishment of a stable administration during the struggle for independence and the arguments for continuing colonial control, this topic was mostly disregarded in favor of a speedy handover of power from European authorities in the majority of African countries. Western academics emphasized a number of issues that affected African countries following their independence, such as "juridical sovereignty," the emergence of "shadow states," and other associated worries. These difficulties were exacerbated by clientelist activities, in which people used the state for personal gain, and the detrimental consequences of structural adjustment measures, which sought to tackle these concerns. Independence leaders had a vital role in shaping and addressing African security during this time. Their primary goals were to dismantle colonial governance, establish nation-building initiatives after colonization, with a particular

emphasis on consolidating authoritarian control, and manage external influence, principally motivated by Cold War considerations.

Abu Jeng in his book *Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice* writes, “A new security agenda for Africa started to take shape after the Cold War ended and democratization started in Benin in 1991 and expanded throughout the continent. The primary objective of this technique was to efficiently manage the potentially volatile transitions from authoritarianism to violence. The focus was mostly on promoting peacekeeping initiatives and establishing liberal institutions. This was formalized via the implementation of the United Nations Secretary General's Agenda for Peace (1992; amended 1995) and reflected similar significant initiatives of that period, such as the Commonwealth's Commission on Global Governance (Governance, 1995). In the early 1990s, African officials, led by Salim Salim at the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), endeavoured to rejuvenate the regional approach to security in Africa. These initiatives established the basis for numerous normative modifications that were subsequently enacted through the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa” (Jeng, 2012).

The conversation on African security changed dramatically as the international community and its African allies failed to effectively address the growing levels of instability, destruction, and genocide in countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The emergence of "new wars" in Africa, fuelled by a combination of avarice and grievances, has exposed the notable deficiencies of certain African countries in effectively managing intricate matters pertaining to legitimacy and equitable allocation of national resources (Kaldor, 1999). Roland Paris in his book *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* writes, “These shortcomings may be ascribed to issues such as ethnic divides, enduring poverty, and governmental corruption or ineptitude. The result was to initiate a comprehensive dialogue that identified the origins of African insecurity as stemming from governance inadequacies and aimed to address them via a range of policy suggestions. These ideas included foreign involvement for humanitarian purposes and were based on past experiences of reforming the continent's economic and governance structures. The concept of "liberal peace," which was implemented through the UN Summit on the Responsibility to Protect and the establishment of the Commission on Peacebuilding in 2005, was operationalized through UN-sanctioned operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan” (Paris, 2004).

A comprehensive system comprising five key components, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is comprised of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Early Warning System (EWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund. In Africa, the increased efforts to address security issues were incorporated into the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transformation into the African Union (AU) in 2002, following the adoption of the Constitutive Act. Furthermore, only five of the eight regional economic communities (RECs) that are included in the APSA now hold a major position in this industry. A proposed continental union's essential components, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have started establishing regional versions of the African Standby Force (ASF) and Early Warning

Systems (EWS). (Department, 2010). Article 4 of the African Union (AU) outlines intervention rules that beyond those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU's predecessor.

The concept of "non-indifference," which expressly encourages participation in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other conflicts when the state has disregarded its obligations to its citizens, is the new foundation for the defensive approach to sovereignty. (Union, 2000). In addition, the Common African Defense and Security Policy (formed in 2004) and the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (passed in 2009) showed a stronger support for democratic government, peacekeeping, and institutional growth. (Vines, 2013). Compared to its predecessor, the AU has taken a proactive approach to resolving security-related issues at the continental level. In the last ten years, the African Union (AU) has taken strong action to address constitutional infractions, suspending nine member states, imposing fines on six member governments, and approving many peace support missions. (Vines, 2013).

However, there is a sense that the relationship between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is "unequal" and ambiguous. Strong peace assistance missions can be sent out by some established regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, several Regional Economic Communities (RECs) struggle to address security-related issues. (Union, 2010). The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are two of the African Union's (AU) most important bilateral and international partners. Although the African Union (AU) emphasizes the significance of African ownership in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) process, this is largely a rhetorical position because 98% of the funding for the AU's operational parts comes from Western countries (Judith, 2012). The majority of funding for certain peacekeeping operations, like as the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), has mostly been sourced from European Union money (Porto, 2010). Additionally, the formalization of the AU-UN Security Council relationship—a proposal primarily backed by South Africa during its two terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council—means that African security concerns and AU participation will be given significant attention on the global scene. The growing sales of weapons, which are primarily controlled by Western and Russian weaponry manufacturers, also raise serious security concerns. But Chinese miniguns are also becoming more popular in this area. (Holtom, 2013).

In official inspection procedures, these issues are frequently disregarded. The improvements in African security remain uneven and concerning, notwithstanding changes in official policy and increased international participation. While UN involvement has been limited to specific participation in peacekeeping and monitoring operations in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Sudan, regional leadership has been demonstrated in peace support activities during hostilities in West Africa. Africa's challenging conditions seem to be trapped in a cycle of insecurity due to the continent's underdeveloped state, which is characterized by countries that are burdened with increasing levels of debt and are unable to generate sufficient domestic revenue or attract investment in the public sector. Additionally, foreign investment community is primarily focused on the extractive industry. (Holtom, 2013).

## African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Union (AU), which was formally established in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, has begun the challenging task of changing its practices and structures. These modifications aim to forge on with a new course for the African continent in the twenty-first century, while simultaneously consolidating and strengthening the victories made during the anti-colonial struggle. Some people consider this century to be Africa's golden period. Most people think that if Africa is to lead the world in the twenty-first century, it must handle its ongoing security and socioeconomic problems in a comprehensive and strategic way. The African Union (AU) has created normative and institutional frameworks to resolve the numerous conflicts that have impeded the continent's development and prevented it from reaching its full potential. The irony that Africa has lagged behind other continents in terms of development, although possessing vast natural resources, is now widely recognized across the continent. This could, however, alter if Africa's current patterns of economic progress persist. (Bah, 2014)

The enactment of the Constitutive Act, which formed the African Union (AU), indicated a fundamental revolution in Africa's worldwide connections. Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive intervene brought a major shift by allowing AU member states the ability to intervene in situations affecting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. The change from a policy of non-intervention to what is now generally known as non-indifference was largely inspired by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The genocide in that country showed two major aspects: firstly, the lack of a moral and legal framework to legitimize involvement, and secondly, the substantial shortage in the capacity to help, even if the legal impediments were overcome. Motivated by the principle of "never again," the African Union abandoned the prior norms that had restricted contacts between African countries, notably regarding meddling in the internal affairs of its member states. The idea of non-indifference, a proactive norm, was accepted to prevent the recurrence of the heinous atrocities that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 across the whole continent (Bah, 2014).

The AU put into force the Protocol concerning the formation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which went into effect on December 26, 2003, to further support its shift in standards. The Protocol includes a thorough and all-inclusive strategy for advancing security and peace. This strategy employs strategies include averting confrontations, issuing alerts in advance, engaging in preventive diplomacy, encouraging peace talks, endorsing democratic norms, stepping in when necessary, delivering aid, and managing emergencies. An intricate African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was constructed by the Protocol. The APSA's goal is to give the African Union the necessary instruments to achieve the goals set forth in the Peace and Security Council Protocol and the Constitutive Act. (Bah, 2014).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created as the central hub of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and to function as a permanent decision-making body of the African Union (AU). The support for it will come from the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund. The defined tasks of these underscore the vital relevance of interdependence and synergy among the pillars, as stated in the Protocol. The Regional

Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are important components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Therefore, there is an extra parallel process of developing operational systems in the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms. Therefore, the achievement of the effectiveness of the APSA relies heavily on a mutually beneficial connection between the several APSA components at one level, and the AU and the RECs/RMs at another level (Bah, 2014).

Article 12 of the Protocol stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission receives early warning information via the CEWS. This is meant to allow the PSC an opportunity to take the required steps after thoroughly analyzing the concerns. The Panel of the Wise has the ability to be employed in order to help the Peace and Security Council's initiatives (as mentioned in Article 11). In conditions of great severity, as specified in Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, it has the capacity to begin some form of action. Therefore, an African Standby Force will be formed to meet such eventualities (Article 13). The Protocol presents a comprehensive peace and security framework that strives to handle serious security challenges in Africa. Therefore, the success of the APSA in the medium to long-term depends on guaranteeing synergistic and cohesive methods (Bah, 2014).

### **Regional Conflict Resolution Approach**

**Approach Resolving Regional Conflicts** Since the early 1990s, addressing intra-state disputes and enhancing domestic governance have been seen as essential elements for effectively implementing regional agendas in Africa (Hentz, 2013). The involvement of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU) in these areas is driven by an effort to address and overcome what Hentz, Söderbaum, and Tavares have referred to as the "Africa Paradox": although African states are willing to transfer sovereignty to regional organizations, they still struggle to fully exercise certain aspects of sovereignty (Soderbaum, 2012).

The result is the formation of regional organizations that aim to establish security communities, with the North Atlantic community serving as the preferred model. However, these organizations must prioritize tackling violence and instability within their member states. As noted in the foreword to the Routledge Handbook of African Security, the biggest source of instability in Africa is domestic violence and its subsequent influence on surrounding nations (Hentz J. , 2013). Disputes concerning the determination of African boundaries are uncommon, even though there is a general perception that the arbitrary establishment of most of these lines reduces their legitimacy. Due to the particular circumstances, the security dilemma faced by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) involves a challenging task of finding a balance between their desire to implement intrusive agendas and the tendency of the member-states involved to limit such intervention to justifying the existing state of affairs and maintaining regime stability.

The security challenge was reinforced in 2012 owing to the complicated debates that continually postponed the introduction of a United Nations sponsored ECOWAS military presence in Mali. Restoring the authority of the Malian state in the northern portion of the country, which was controlled by Islamists, necessitated

stressing that this step would not globally validate the coup perpetrated by the military junta in Bamako in March 2012. The anarchy that followed the coup had a crucial part in allowing the Islamists and Tuaregs to effectively gain control of the North. Due to the international sanctions, the Bamako junta was ultimately obliged to accept the creation of a government of national unity on 22 August 2012. On 11 November 2012, the ECOWAS head of States expressed their acceptance of a comprehensive proposal to build an Africa-led multinational force. They acknowledged the major position of Mali in this undertaking, but also highlighted that military and diplomatic operations would prioritize the restoration of constitutional order, as well as the unity and territorial integrity of the nation. The cornerstone of the strategy used by the ECOWAS was the Interim President of Mali's pledge to promptly unveil a plan for conducting elections that are unbiased, equitable, and open to scrutiny.

For some struggling regional economic organizations, the establishment of institutions focused on security has provided opportunities to improve their resources and credibility. ECCAS, a primarily formal economic alliance in Central Africa, has been actively striving since 2002 to develop a new role for itself in the field of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Within the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), now referred to as IGAD, has established itself as a platform and a means of communication for activities supported by the United Nations, European Union, and United States regarding Somalia, Sudan, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. Policy formation at the regional level is significantly impacted by the political dynamics within member nations and their ability to adopt public policies, especially in connection to the notion of security as a shared benefit. Aning's chapter in this collection emphasizes that the African state is the key framework for understanding African security, both at a national and regional level.

Prior to the early 1990s, Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations were primarily concerned with economic integration and did not prioritize concepts such as rule of law, good governance, and security. This chapter covers the history of regionalism in Africa, beginning with its initial focus on regional economic integration and proceeding to its contemporary concentrate on regional security. Subsequent chapters in the book will examine the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community Central African States (ECCAS), following a detailed analysis of the African Union.

The primary justification for regional economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa was to encourage collective self-reliance. This purpose was demonstrated by the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and Abuja Treaty (1991), which intended to build an African Economic Community. The implementation of import-substitution policies in African countries was founded on the commonly held opinion among rulers, educators, government officials, and experts that African nations were locked in a dependent relationship with the industrialized North. Moreover, and of uttermost consequence, that relationship was recognized as innately unbalanced and self-sustaining. Severing the connections between African governments and their former

colonial powers was seen as an essential prerequisite for economic progress, particularly since trading arrangements sometimes required the export of raw materials in exchange for finished products.

Minimal advancements have been made in the direction of regional economic cooperation, much alone integration, since the first stages. However, the scope of regional economic cooperation schemes, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has grown to incorporate both regional security and economic cooperation. The obstacles that hindered the advancement of regional economic cooperation have been reinterpreted in a broader sense as manifestations of governance and security issues.

The conventional link between regional integration and the transfer of sovereign powers, as seen in Europe, is not aligned with the political dynamics of post-colonial Africa. Prior to the end of the cold war period, the majority of African states were controlled by authoritarian military or single-party regimes that violently rejected any constraints on the extension of power and personal fortunes of the governing elites. The concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states served as the essential underpinning that both regional organizations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were supposed to adhere to. Post-colonial patronage linkages and Cold War alliances, in addition to being of paramount relevance, allowed different means to handling regional security challenges within sub-regional associations. The member nations were sharply divided because they had differing notions of what security should involve. Some member states emphasized not interfering in the internal affairs of other member states, while seeing security as a subject that should not be discussed.

After twenty years, the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, together with the African Union (AU), derive a significant portion of their legitimacy and resources from their ambition to act as peacekeepers and organizations that promote self-control. The regional implications of violence and lack of respect for legal standards within member-states are no longer minimized or overlooked. The influence of unstable conflict-ridden states in Africa is increasingly understood to have substantial contagion repercussions. Conflict has the propensity to fast expand across Africa's porous borders, as shown by the crises in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Darfur. Region-building in Africa has largely and clearly redirected its emphasis towards the rehabilitation of nations and the strengthening of sovereignty (Bach, 2013).

The shift of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU) towards peace and security operations stands in stark contrast to their underwhelming performance in fulfilling their initial mandate and stated objectives, which primarily focused on fostering economic integration to ultimately establish a pan-African market. Following an examination of the concept known as new regionalism, it is imperative to explore the transformation of regionalism from its initial emphasis on economics to comprehensive agendas that prioritize regional security and governance.

## African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) is defined in Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. A vital component of the African Peace and Security Architecture is the African Standby Force (ASF). Its main responsibility is to support the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in effectively carrying out its mandate. Five regional standby forces, formerly referred to as regional brigades, comprise the ASF. The Logistics Depot (LD), a Brigade Headquarters, and a specialized Planning Element (PLANELM) that operates full-time comprise the structure of the regional forces. (Bah, 2014).

Comprises the units that have pledged support to the brigade. The various Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are currently in varying phases of establishing the previously mentioned organizations. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that some areas—the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for example—have chosen not to build a permanent Brigade Headquarters. Discussions about the involvement of different regional groups in the ASF membership have been contentious. The Regional Economic Communities may have ideally served as the foundation for the formation of the ASF regional brigade. Currently, there are eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Standby Force (ASF) is built around five zones. Consequently, numerous Member States are linked with several regional brigades. Consequently, the usage of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) as the structural components of the ASF brigades has proved to be tricky. Nevertheless, the five regional categories are provisionally categorized as the text that comes after this statement (Bah, 2014):

The following nations are part of the Southern African Grouping, sometimes known as the Southern Africa Standby Force (SASF): Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Members of the Central Grouping are Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Mauritius and Madagascar are included in this group as well. The Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) is a coalition of countries that includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome Principe; Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the potential to be members of the Southern Grouping; the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is made up of the following West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. (Bah, 2014).

The North African Regional Capability (NARC), also known as the North African Grouping, is made up of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, and the Western Sahara. However, this brigade has not yet made the anticipated advancement. The ASF was supposed to be established in two sections and formally inaugurated in 2010 according to the 2003 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the 2005 Roadmap for the operationalization of the ASF, which was later improved by Roadmap II. As stated in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, by the end of Phase II in 2010, the ASF was supposed to be fully ready for deployment, including in complex peacekeeping operations and interventions in response to grave situations like war crimes, crimes against humanity, and

genocide. It was determined that the ASF had just reached its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) following the AMANI Africa Exercise. In order to assist the ASF in achieving its Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2015, Roadmap III was developed. (Bah, 2014).

As seen during the Amani Africa Exercise, there are still practical problems with the adoption of the Draft AU decision-making process and the lack of a cogent policy for mandating and coordinating the ASF, even though the ASF is anticipated to be fully operational by 2015. In addition, as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Union (AU) is actively working to establish a comprehensive legal framework that will supervise the establishment and deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF) until it reaches full operational capacity (FOC) by 2015. This will help to clarify the main purpose of the PSC and other similar organizations at the regional economic community (REC) level. This will help to clarify the main purpose of the PSC and other similar organizations at the regional economic community (REC) level. Together with addressing other issues, the AU's technological capability needs to be enhanced. Certain components, such as the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and logistical infrastructure, like the construction of the Regional Logistic Base (RLB) in Douala, Cameroon, must be in place before Regional Brigades can be activated for upcoming ASF operations. (Alhaji Bah, 2014).

In its communiqué PSC/PR/BR (CLXVI), dated January 16, 2009, the PSC commended the Commission on the steps it had taken in Roadmap II. It particularly recognized the work and advancements in creating Regional Brigades, creating Rapid Deployment Capability, and carrying out the ASF Training Plan via the AMANI Africa Exercise. Furthermore, the ASF Policy papers need to be implemented, and the Commission has been directed by the PSC to finish the additional papers. These recommendations will be made to the security and defense ministers for quick action so that the ASF can be put into effect by 2010. The African Union (AU) reported in May 2009 on the developments at the 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) and Heads of Safety and Security, which came about as a result of the PSC adopting the communiqué. This meeting was held after the ACDS Experts Meeting. (Bah, 2014).

In their joint declaration, the heads of safety and security and the African Chiefs of Defence Staff acknowledged ongoing efforts to advance the Civilian Dimension, create the ASF Training Plan for 2009–2010, create Continental Logistics Bases (CLBs), develop the Strategic Lift Capability Concept, execute the Formed Police Unit (FPU) Concept, and improve the Rapid Deployment Capability Concept. A major obstacle identified by the Experts Meeting is the absence of mutual understanding about mission authorization between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) / Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the African Union Commission (AUC). This challenge stems from the way the ASF is currently designed and implemented.

The ASF, as stated in the applicable ASF Policy documents and later developed by the institution, is a military force organized into five Regional Brigades. These brigades comprise of contingents with varied areas of competence who are ready for action in their respective home nations. The ASF contains Brigades that are founded and supported by the five Regional Economic Communities / Regional Mechanisms

(ECOWAS, NARC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS, and SADC). These communities serve as important components of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture. The structural arrangement of the ASF indicates that there are at least two entities that have control over the use and implementation of the ASF: the AU and RECs/RMs (Bah, 2014).

According to the ASF Policy Framework, each REC/RM is required to have a capacity of around 5,000 people by 2010, which includes military, police, and civilian components. This means that the entire capacity of the ASF will reach a range of 25,000 - 30,000 (Potgieter, 2009). Government commitment of ASF personnel before deployment decision has the potential to address some of the force creation challenge. But the creation of the necessary legal frameworks between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as between RECs/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and member states, is ultimately what will determine how well this process is carried out. The national legislature's approval of the relevant laws is also crucial. The AU would still be required to have separate talks with member states to secure the release of their pledged contingents in the event that the proper legal documents were not present. Member states may face serious legal obstacles when deploying their dedicated forces in the absence of suitable national legislation, particularly for sensitive African Union missions. (Bah, 2014).

The implementation of the ASF has made significant strides, however the level of accomplishment differs across different regions. The breakthrough in developing a multidimensional framework for the ASF is possibly one of the most remarkable accomplishments up to date. The Military and Police components have been developed in all Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). Nevertheless, there are still considerable shortcomings, notably concerning the civilian component. It is necessary to rapidly address the absence of a binding framework between the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and their member states. Meanwhile, the AU should establish a comprehensive policy to promote and support increasing awareness and understanding of the African Swine Fever (ASF). The expectation is that the knowledge gained from the 2010 AMANI exercise and the practical experience gained from the AU's peace operations in Darfur (AMIS and UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM) would help in obtaining Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2015 (Bah, 2014).

### **African Court of Human Rights and Justice**

One of the provisions of the African Union Constitutive Act was the creation of an African Court of Justice, the African Union's principal bodies (AU). In July 2003, the Court Protocol was approved. However, the Court never got up and running. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights was established in July 2008 as a consequence of the AU Assembly's decision to merge the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. (Union, 2015).

In an effort to unify the courts, the Assembly approved the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice (Assembly/AU/Dec.196 (XI)). The African Court of Justice and Human Rights has jurisdiction over all cases and legal matters, as per Article 28 of the 2008 Protocol. The African Charter, Union treaties,

subsidiary legal documents, the African Constitutive Act, and any issues pertaining to international law are all at issue in these conflicts. (Union, 2015).

The African Court of Justice and Human Rights is governed by the Statute outlined in Assembly/AU/Dec.529(XXIII), which was ratified by the Assembly in June 2014. The 2008 Protocol Regarding the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which was officially approved by 15 Member States, will govern the African Court of Justice and Human Rights until the transition process begins. There were thirty in September of 2014. Madagascar was the country that had signed the 2008 Protocol as of January 31, 2014. Five states have signed the protocol in total. Benin became the latest country to ratify it on June 28, 2012. (Union, 2015).

The Assembly of the African Union has concluded the foundation of a new Court, known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, by adopting the Protocol on its Statute. This Court is recognized as the premier judicial body of the African Union (Justice, 2002). The new Protocol replaces two former protocols, notably the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court (known to as the "1998 Protocol") and the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (referred to as the "2003 Protocol") (Rights, 1998). Considering the fundamental purpose of the 1998 Protocol under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) was to fortify and reinforce the protective power of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. This decision was spurred by the increased attention on human rights and democracy in Africa during the late 1990s. Despite certain upgrades to the Commission's individual complaint system, it nonetheless remains rather inadequate (Justice, 2002) .

In accordance with Article 18 of the African Union Constitutive Act ("the Act"), the 2003 Protocol was agreed upon. Compared to the Organization of African Unity, the African Union has higher goals. The only court mentioned in the Act is the Court of Justice, indicating that the new court was intended to have jurisdiction over a range of subjects covered by the Act. This covers disagreements over international law, how the Act should be interpreted and applied, and other treaties and agreements made inside the framework of the African Union. (Elias, 2009).

The African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Union Court of Justice were to be merged by the Assembly of the African Union in July 2004. President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was serving as the Assembly's acting chairperson at the time, made a suggestion that served as the foundation for this decision. Fears over the growing number of African Union institutions and the costs associated with their upkeep led to the decision. Consolidating the limited resources assigned to a single court was the main goal. In January 2005, the African Union Commission suggested that the 1998 and 2003 Protocols be changed and that these adjustments be implemented by adopting a new protocol by the Member States. This proposal would have compelled the initiation of activities for the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR") after the 1998 Protocol became effective, even before the ratification process for the Protocol on the Court of Justice was finished. As a consequence, the unification of the two courts would have been necessary at a later

date (Union, 2005). However, in July 2005, the Assembly eventually determined that the merger should be completed by executing a single legal instrument. During the Eleventh Summit of the African Union, held from June to July 2008, the Assembly accepted the modified Protocol, adopting the Assembly's resolution from July 2005 (Justice, 2008).

As per African Charter "The amended Protocol provides that the Constitutive Act of the African Union shall be construed in respect to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). There were concerns expressed concerning the apparent overlap in jurisdiction *ratione materiae* between the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the Court of Justice of the African Union. To overcome this, the new Court was split into two sections: a General Affairs Section and a Human Rights Section, each consisting of eight judges" (African Charter, 1998). All issues, except those concerning human and/or peoples' rights, which are the exclusive domain of the Human Rights Section, fall under the purview of the General Section. The judges assigned to each Section have varying qualifications. Every Section also has the option to send a matter for review to the entire Court.

According to the new Protocol, the 1998 Protocol will remain in force for up to a year following the implementation of the new Protocol. This enables the ACHPR to set up the appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of its powers, resources, privileges, and responsibilities. The current members of the ACHPR were chosen in 2006 and will hold their positions until the ACJHR justices are appointed. Unresolved matters will be transferred by the court to the new court's Human Rights Section. This will allay concerns that the combination will obstruct the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' advancement. (ACHPR) (Elias, 2009).

There has been debate concerning the relationship between the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACJHR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). It has now been communicated that the ACJHR Rules of Procedure must address this link. The relationship and collaboration between the Court and other treaty bodies of the Union are taken into consideration by the Rules of Court, as stated in Article 38 of the Statute. (El-Sheikh, 2002).

In relation to jurisdiction *ratione personae*, the Court may receive a matter from States Parties to the new Protocol, organs of the African Union, and staff members of the Union, as specified in Article 29 of the Statute, in line with the Staff Rules and Regulations. The revised Protocol in human rights disputes remains a significant component of the 1998 Protocol. This aspect permits actions to be brought before the Court not only based on the African Charter on Human Rights and the related Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, or the Charter on the Rights of the Welfare of the Child, but also on the basis of any instrument that has been ratified by a State Party to the new Protocol (Article 30). The ACJHR might serve as a forum for resolving a variety of international transgressions, including breaches of humanitarian law, violations of human rights, and other human rights-related issues. Nevertheless, the 1998 Protocol's requirement that Member States expressly acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction over cases brought by accredited non-

governmental organizations and individuals remains in the new Protocol, despite the demands of numerous non-governmental organizations for direct access to the Court. (Elias, 2009).

Considering that sub-regional courts in Africa allow people direct access, including the East African Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the Court of Justice of the Common Market of the East and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community Tribunal, and the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, it can be viewed as a step backward. Nonetheless, this phrase may be important if States do make declarations acknowledging jurisdiction and if the African Union is kind in certifying NGOs. (Elias, 2009).

In accordance with the recently enacted Protocol, Article 46, the ACJHR is required to submit cases of non-adherence to its decisions to the Assembly of the African Union. The Assembly will then determine what has to be done to apply punishment. The application of rulings by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has much improved, although it is still unclear how the Assembly would handle enforcement. (Elias, 2009).

It is crucial to build a pan-African court with wide jurisdiction, especially since there are already several sub-regional courts that might be combined into a court system with the African court of the new Protocol acting as the ultimate authority. It would be interesting to watch how the Human Rights Section of the ACJHR develops the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, especially with regard to third generation human rights (sometimes called rights of solidarity) and its emphasis on personal responsibility. (Elias, 2009).

### **UN-AU Security Interface**

In Africa, as well as in other parts of the world, the purpose of various multilateral initiatives on peace and security is to address the underlying causes of conflict by pursuing socio-political and economic transformation through the promotion of democracy and market liberalism. This separates them from prior United Nations missions (Berdal, 2009). In 1992, the UN Secretary General devised a comprehensive strategy to international participation in post-conflict nations, describing peacebuilding as more than merely restoring peace after hostilities stop. The Brahimi Report, issued eight years later, launched a revision of the UN's approach to peace operations (Nations, 2000). It highlighted poverty as a core cause of conflict and advised overcoming it via the promotion of sustainable development and a democratic society that respects human rights. The study also urged for a more important role for the UN in peacebuilding (Nations, 2015). Consequently, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was founded in 2005 with its particular power for focused global participation. The Peacebuilding Commission gained more recognition via the 2011 World Development Report on "Conflict, Peace, and Development" and the concurrent efforts of the OECD-DAC group on "fragile states (Bank, 2011)."

Simultaneously, as international discussions on peacebuilding were progressing towards the formal establishment of practices, there was a parallel interest in Western and African academic and policymaking circles to make state sovereignty dependent on responsible governance and to broaden the possibilities for humanitarian intervention (Deng, 1996). In 2000, a group financed by Canada was created to discuss interference and state sovereignty. This commission was closely tied to the African Union's (AU) strong support for humanitarian intervention. The development of the 2005 UN World Summit and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was based on the ideas expressed in the foundational act of 2002. Collectively, these achievements throughout the early 2000s played a crucial part in constructing what is now known as the "liberal peacebuilding" paradigm. This approach has since been widely adopted by the international community for managing the challenges of rebuilding states, revitalizing economies, and fostering social harmony in post-war scenarios (Soares, 2011).

The United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) are both highly motivated to enhance the efficiency of peace operations in Africa. Both councils aim to use the diverse UN-AU peace and security cooperation efforts in order to further their respective goals. Various procedures have been put in place since 2006 to promote the execution of the African Union's concept of "non-indifference." Significant progress has been achieved in the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, which has become deep, multifaceted, and mature. However, there are still differences of opinion on the most effective approach to address specific peace and security concerns in Africa, and the African Union still lacks crucial abilities when it comes to peace operations (Williams, 2013).

Analysing the growth of collaboration between the two councils on peace operations is essential, and it is important to explore ways in which the institutions might enhance their cooperation in this domain. Following an introduction to the cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) on peace and security matters, with a specific focus on peace operations, it is important to examine the AU Mission in Somalia as a significant example that illustrates both the favourable and unfavourable features of the UN-AU partnership. Several persisting barriers must be resolved in order for the two councils to optimize their collaboration and effectively undertake legitimate and effective peace operations. There is potential for providing practical suggestions to improve the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in this specific field (Williams, 2013).

Three factors stand in the way of better cooperation between the AU and UN on peace operations: the two councils' political and strategic relationship; their bureaucratic and organizational interactions; and the dynamics within the AU itself, particularly those between the Peace and Security Council, the AU Commission, and its member states. The following concrete suggestions can be implemented to address these dimensions: a) harmonizing the two councils' decision-making procedures; b) filling significant gaps in the African Union's representation in New York; and c) creating more efficient channels of communication between the elected African members of the UN Security Council and the African Union's Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa (Williams, 2013).

It is important to highlight the political nature of the interactions between the two councils and their members. Therefore, political tensions that inevitably arise when delicate topics and crises are discussed would not be completely eliminated by any kind of institutional restructuring. A trade-off must be made between creating new systems, enhancing the capabilities of existing institutional frameworks, and creating flexible arrangements that can swiftly respond to unforeseen and rapidly evolving peace and security issues (Williams, 2013).

The development of a distinctive alliance between the EU Commission and the African Union (AU) Commission may be traced back to the endorsement of the AU's Constitutive Act in 2000. The EU Commission demonstrated interest in a rewriting of the pan-African Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, which, in a formal sense, primarily drew influence from the EU (Bach-1, 2008). The African Union's new acronym (AU) was an obvious homage to the EU model. The Secretariat of the previous Organization of African Unity (OAU) was named as the Commission, and the former Secretary-General of the OAU took the function of President of the new Commission. Additionally, there was a Permanent Representatives' Committee that matched the European Union's Committee of Permanent Representatives, also known as Comité des Représentants Permanents (Coreper). The creation of a Community, Solidarity, Development and Compensation Fund was meant to redress the regional inequities among AU members. This fund is reminiscent of the structural financing of the EU. In the realm of peacekeeping and security, the United Nations (UN) Security Council served as a model for the institutional structure of the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). However, the PSC's functions and goals were designed to be incorporated into a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), which drew parallels with the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Bach, 2011).

The AU Constitutive Act significantly deviated from the OAU Charter's previous focus on absolute non-interference in member nations' internal affairs, making it more significant than the formal replication of the European model. According to Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the African Union has the ability to interfere in a Member State in circumstances of major violations such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This intervention is based on a resolution reached by the Assembly of the AU. The signatories also voiced their strong disapproval and rejection of 'impunity and political murder, acts of terrorism, and subversive activities' as stated in Article 4 (o), as well as 'unconstitutional changes of government' as stated in Article 4 (p). According to Article 30, the African Union (AU) has the ability to suspend the membership of any country that breached these ideals.

Following the catastrophic events in Somalia and Rwanda, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) were reluctant to commit armed personnel for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. This was linked to the confirmation of these ideas and a readiness to take on new obligations. This convergence made it possible for Europe to embrace a positive disengagement policy aimed at bolstering Africa-led initiatives and enhancing the continent's ability to effectively govern, avert crises, and maintain peace. After the Balkan crisis exposed Europe's shortcomings in conflict prevention, European participation in short-term

peacekeeping missions in Africa was initially seen as a chance to assess the objectives of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

The European Commission saw a chance to broaden the scope of its first-pillar (Community) efforts in providing financial, human, and logistical support to the African Union (AU) and its peacekeeping operations. These programs, which were implemented through peace and security missions, had a close connection to development goals. Through the CSDP, the European Commission now has the authority to create and carry out independent policies in a field that was previously in the exclusive jurisdiction of EU member states. By establishing a unique financial vehicle known as the African Peace Facility (APF), the EU Commission has provided the AU with significant financial support for peacekeeping operations. The APF was instrumental in transforming the EU into the AU's principal donor, having siphoned out a sizeable 250 million from the European Development Fund.

Constructive disengagement has led to multiple instances of European troops being deployed directly into Africa. Examples include the European Union Force's (Eufor) 2006 deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, and the EU's 2007 deployment to Chad and the Central African Republic. These short-lived interventions did, however, obviously aim to set the stage for the handover of power to UN forces. The increased "Europeanization" or coordination of the policies of EU member states has also been connected to these tendencies.

### **Darfur**

A civil conflict that started in 2003 resulted in the relocation of around two million people and the deaths of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Darfuris. Numerous crimes, including the murder and rape of people, have been committed during the battle between the Government of Sudan and militias and other armed opposition organizations. The UN first raised the alarm about the Darfur situation in 2003, and the Security Council and two successive Secretaries-General have made it a high priority to find a long-term solution.

On May 5, 2006, the UN and other partners joined forces to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which was endorsed by the African Union (AU). A revitalized peace process, led by a joint AU-UN mediator and taking place in Doha, Qatar, from 2010 to June 2011, resulted in a framework document despite the lack of signatories. Intense political and diplomatic efforts are still underway to persuade the non-signatories to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

(Nations, 2020).

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) enhanced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and got ready to launch an unprecedented joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur after the High-Level meetings held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on November 16, 2006. Sudan accepted this force in June 2007 after Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and a number of other international players engaged in intensive diplomacy. The Security Council formally formed the African Union/UN hybrid operation in

Darfur on July 31, 2007, by adopting resolution 1769, often known by its acronym UNAMID, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Officially, AMIS was replaced by UNAMID on December 31, 2007. (Nations, 2020).

Every year, the mandate is renewed. On August 26, 2014, Security Council resolution 2173 was adopted, extending the mandate for an additional 10 months, until June 30, 2015. El Fasher, North Darfur, is home to the Mission's headquarters. El Geneina (West Darfur), Nyala (South Darfur), Zalingei (Central Darfur), and El Daein (East Darfur) are the locations of its sector headquarters. There are 35 deployment areas for the mission spread across the five states of Darfur. As of July 31, 2007, 25,987 uniformed peacekeepers were authorized to be part of the Mission. This comprised 2,660 formed police units (FPU), 19,555 soldiers, 360 military observers and liaison officers, and 3,772 police advisers. UNAMID was one of the biggest UN peacekeeping missions as of mid-2011, operating at 90% of its maximum authorized strength. (Nations, 2020).

The Security Council resolved to reduce the strength of the military and police components by passing resolution 2063 on July 31, 2012. There are now 23,743 approved individuals working for the Mission. This comprises a civilian component of up to 4,495 peacekeepers (1,185 international staff, 340 UN volunteers, and 2,970 national personnel) and up to 19,248 uniformed peacekeepers (15,845 troops, 1,583 police advisers, and 1,820 organized police units) (Nations, 2020)..

In the fiscal year 2013–2014, UNAMID allocated US\$ 1.29 billion to its budget. UNAMID operates in harsh terrain and a complicated, frequently hostile political context, posing a number of logistical and security challenges. Critical infrastructure, aviation assets, equipment, and transportation are also lacking for the Mission. In the meanwhile, UNAMID is making every effort within the constraints of its limited resources to safeguard civilians in Darfur, support the humanitarian relief effort, and contribute to creating an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of peace. Every day, the mission conducts about 100 patrols. Additionally, UNAMID attempts to address some of the conflict's major causes. (Nations, 2020).

UNAMID's work is complemented by joint efforts on the political front. Until mid-2008, the Joint Mediation Support Team was led by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the AU Special Envoy for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim. On 30 June 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping appointed Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, as the new joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur. As of 8 June 2011, Mr. Bassolé returned to Burkina Faso, and Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special Representative (JSR) of UNAMID, became the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim. Aichatou Mindaoudou, Deputy JSR (Political) for UNAMID, took over as Joint Chief Mediator a.i. on August 1, 2012, replacing Mr. Gambari. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma designated Ghana's Mohamed Ibn Chambas as UNAMID's Joint Special Representative and UN-AU Chief Mediator on December 20, 2013.

As a result, UNAMID offers valuable insight into the AU's role in the Darfur conflict resolution process. AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia, is an analogous example.

## **Abyei**

The ongoing peace process between Sudan and South Sudan, which separated geographically in July 2011 following a largely calm referendum in January 2011, is an extremely important stage in their intricate relationship. The oil transfer system, boundary demarcation, competing claims over the Abyei region, citizenship determination and people exchange, and mutual mistrust for supporting rebel groups on respective regions are among the difficult bilateral problems in the post-secession disputes. As a result, the two Sudans are perpetually at odds with one another while there is a period of peace. (Nations, 2020).

Three rounds of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan seem to be quite important. They first agreed to a non-aggression pact in February 2012, then in September of the same year, they signed agreements on commerce, energy, and security. They intended to establish a demilitarized buffer zone and prepare the foundation for the restart of oil sales during this round. But they were unable to settle border disputes, especially those involving the disputed Abyei region. Third, they committed to following the schedules that were established to carry out the agreements on border security, oil, and security that were negotiated in the previous rounds of talks in January 2013. In addition, its leaders decided that the establishment of a demilitarized zone along their disputed border would be a prerequisite for the start of oil exports again.

However, the fact that tensions over security and oil have regularly led to a string of armed clashes between the two sides is cause for concern. The otherwise steady peace process is in danger of being derailed by this belligerent posturing.

It's important to note that the international community is continuously attempting to resolve the bilateral dispute between Sudan and South Sudan by interacting with them in various ways. In addition to backing the African Union (AU)-led peacekeeping effort in the Abyei region, the UN keeps pressing the two parties to engage in talks. In March 2011, the United States designated Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman as its special envoy for Sudan; in December 2011, China dispatched Liu Guijin, its special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan; and in March 2012, India sent an official in the same capacity. Due to the oil and associated economic stakes in the two nations, foreign parties have so utilized their good offices to diffuse the bilateral stalemate. Sudan and South Sudan have been under constant pressure to settle their differences by the African Union (AU) and the neighboring East African countries, who care more about maintaining regional peace than anything else.

In fact, the mediation efforts of Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and former South African President Thabo Mbeki (speaking for the AU) have greatly aided in getting the two nations to the negotiation table. Desalegn hosted talks in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in September 2012 and January 2013, and

noted that he was 'very much satisfied' with the progress of the latest round of negotiation. He added, "I am very happy that the bottlenecks are now released and the implementation can resume."

Furthermore, since the oil sector—which bears the brunt of the current conflict—continues to be vital to the petro economies, the peace dividends had become increasingly evident for the two adversarial nations themselves. Although the port and transshipment infrastructure are located in Sudan, about 85% of oil wells are located in South Sudan. Although oil revenue makes up 98% of Juba's exchequer, South Sudan's separation has left Khartoum with a 36% budget deficit. Thus, the two parties, entrenched in territorial and oil-related conflicts, are driven by economic necessity to seek a de-escalation of their bilateral dispute.

Nevertheless, there is scope for the economic factors of the peace process getting outweighed by the hawkish constituencies in the respective domestic fronts of the two parties. Sudan wants South Sudan's army, which is called the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), to actively disengage from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile falling under Sudan's territorial jurisdiction. It expects South Sudan to pull back its weaponry and other logistics from the SPLM-N, and to expel any of its members from Juba. For many SPLA generals, SPLM-N fighters are, however, former comrades, and ideologically many of them continue to support the aim of a regime change in Khartoum.

Even though military generals often hold more sway over civilian leadership in Juba, some leaders in Khartoum also believe that dialogue with the SPLM-N should wait until there is concrete proof that their connections to Juba have been severed. The hawkish element in Khartoum has been bolstered in their positions by the recent arrest of several senior insiders on suspicion of organizing a coup and university protests over the unexplained deaths of three Darfuri students. Furthermore, the most heated dispute is over the oil-rich Abyei region, which sits astride the border between North and South Sudan and has enormous oil resources.

A series of peace talks have allowed the post-secession conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, which is fueled by rival territorial claims and key resource ownerships, to enter a de-escalation mode. Following the most recent round of negotiations, both countries have agreed to carry out the security, oil, and border agreements made during previous rounds of negotiations, as well as a time-bound demilitarization process. The continuous efforts to achieve peace, motivated by a confluence of bilateral, regional, and global interests, run the risk of being impeded by internal pressures. As a result, the international community and the regional community—including New Delhi—need to continue and strengthen their meditative engagement with both Khartoum and Juba and assist the two in forging a long-term mutuality.

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