

Moral Standing Of Restored-Natural Entities: A Critical Evaluation.

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The claims made by some environmental ethicists to place nature and restored-natural entities in two domains of moral evaluation has raised many questions by environmental ethicists. Such claim asserts that the dichotomy between nature and artifact leads to some sort of moral dualism where restored-natural entities are not to be evaluated morally at par with natural entities. Eric Katz goes to the extent of considering restored-natural entities as artifacts because of being contaminated and polluted with human intention, design and purposes etc. Due to this restored-natural entities lacks naturalness and their intrinsic values affected. Therefore such entities will have less moral standing or no sufficient moral standing for any moral consideration. But involvement of human design, human intention and purposes do not necessarily create artifact which might lack moral standing because such entities are different from a paradigmatic case of artifact. Following Aristotle's characterization of artifact and natural entities, this paper makes an attempt to show that restored-natural entities are not paradigm case of artifact but natural entities with moral standing. Further, the whole idea of nature-artifact dichotomy is not based on a solid ground as there is no clear demarcation line between nature and artifact. If this paper succeeds in establishing that restored-natural entities continues to be natural, they can possess moral standing and therefore we are obligated to respect them. In this essay an attempt is also made to examine the validity of moral dualism which is rooted in the very nature and validity of such distinction, although it is not the intention of this essay to undermine or reject such dichotomy. This issue is significant from the point of view of environmental ethics which is concern about human relationship with nature or the environment.

Nature and artifact

It is generally agreed that artifacts are different from things of nature or natural entities. Artifacts are designed and created intentionally by humans for certain purposes. Hence artifacts are ontologically dependent on human intention, purpose, design and technology. They can be derived from natural objects but are further designed for certain purposes other than what they have. Artifacts, as Andrew Brennan maintains, have intrinsic function for which they are designed or created. Things in nature are independent of human intention, design etc, they function independently in accordance to their own internal principle or capacities and in accordance to their own telos. Aristotle divides things into those that "exist by nature" and those that exist "from other causes". The former include animals, plants and other simplest bodies, and the latter include bed, a coat and anything of that sort.¹ . He also makes a distinction between *Physis* and *Techne*. *Physis* refers to nature, whereas *Techne* is understood in terms of what is intended and produced by humans. Hence what is intended and produced by humans are ontologically dependent on human intention, designed, purpose etc. He distinguishes nature from artifacts in that natural things have within themselves a principle of movement (or change) and rest, whereas artifacts like bedstead or garments, in so far as they are craft-work, have no such internal capacity to change. That is why things that are in nature have within themselves a principle of movement (or change) and rest, that is they grow and develop in accordance to some

¹ Aristotle, *Physics*, Trans Charlton, W. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1974

internal principle. Artifacts, on the contrary lack such internal principle; rather they require an external agent to change, move etc which is mostly inherent in the author who designs it and the substance from which they are derived. In this manner an artifact depends for its existence on various factors like the author, intention, design and creativity, purpose, raw materials and labor. In other words an artifact consists in the conception of the result to be produced before its realization in the material form. Further, an artifact has to rely on some external causes which can be termed as both formal and efficient causes. The ontological dependence of an artifact on the human mind, intention, purpose etc marks it off from things of nature which grow, develop and achieve their telos independently of human intervention. Things in nature grow, move and perpetuate themselves and their kinds on the basis of an internal principle. Further, it is argued that things in nature have high level of organic unity which constitutes a kind of substantial unity or biological identity. But artifact has low level of organic unity which only exhibits proximity and assemblage of various parts. The level unity in an artifact is very low so as to make an artifact a 'thing'. This kind of characterization refers artifact to what is created and intended in contrast to what is self-regulating and self-governing. In *Physics 2.8* Aristotle shows that nature has its own design and purpose that is goal-oriented rather than arising by chance. In this manner nature also exhibits regularity in its functioning rather than depending on some external factors. In short, it can be argued that nature is different from artifact in the sense that nature is inherently teleological and ontologically independent whereas artifacts are ontologically dependent upon the artist's purpose, design and labor. Due to this many ethicists opined that we cannot ascribe equal moral standing to them.

However, a different kind of characterization was given by Eric Katz. He makes a strong claim about the difference between nature and artifact. He says that artifacts are different from nature because artifacts are essentially the construct of an anthropocentric worldview for certain purposes. His view is that "artifacts are essentially the construct of an anthropocentric worldview. They are designed by humans for humans to satisfy human interests and needs"². Being designed and created for anthropocentric purposes is, for Katz, both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the conceptual characterization of artifacts. He further says that "artifacts thus stand in a necessary *ontological* relationship with human purpose. The existence of human purpose, human intention, is a *necessary* condition for the existence of the artifact"³. He therefore claims that artifacts are strained, adulterated and contaminated with human intentions and purposes. However, he said that it is not the intention in general which is involved in the creation of artifacts. He rather refers to a particular kind of intention which advocates for designing or creating it for the sake of betterment of human life. In other words he refers to such intention which aims at promoting anthropocentric considerations. Hence artifacts can be understood as instruments produced for the betterment of human life⁴. But later one Katz changes his position by claiming that the intention by itself is not sufficient to make an artifact. He therefore attributed to technology which is meant for achieving anthropocentric consideration and which in the process amounts to the destruction of nature. The use of technology for human purpose destroys the natural and biological capacity of nature. In other words, human purpose is the final cause of artifacts, and such purpose is always for human considerations. It is because of this characterization that Katz considers restoration of natural entities as a mean for the creation of artifacts. He is against restoration ecology because it makes natural objects into artifacts. Katz argument is that 'restored-natural entities' are artifacts because he considers that the purpose behind all human restoration of nature is always anthropocentric. Nature restoration projects are the creations of technologies for some purposes. He says that the 'technological fix' of nature merely produces artifacts for the satisfaction of human interest. In this manner he maintains that "the re-created natural environment that is the end result of a restoration project is nothing more than an artifact created for human use"⁵. What follows is that anything which is created and designed, therefore ontologically dependent upon the human intention, design, labor and purposes or

² Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature", p.101

³ Eric Katz, "Artifacts and Functions", p.122

⁴ Eric Katz, "The Call of the Wild: The Struggle against Domination and the Technological Fix of Nature," p.114; "Artifacts and Functions", pp. 122-123, 129-130.

⁵ Eric Katz, "The Big Lie" p 97; "Restoration and Redesigns," p 92.

anthropocentric consideration can be considered as an artifact. The re-created natural environment that is the end result of a restoration project according to him is nothing more than an artifact created for human use.

Moral Dualism

The implication of the dichotomy between nature and artifact necessitates, according to some philosophers, what is termed as moral dualism where nature and artifact are considered cannot be placed on the same ground of moral valuation. Andrew Brennan while talking about the moral standing of natural objects argues that individual natural entities differ from most artifacts in their lack of intrinsic function, for their structure, unlike that of artifacts is not the result of design⁶. He argues that intrinsic functionlessness is a quality by virtue of which all individual natural entities possessing it, whether living or not, have moral standing. Robert Elliot attributes greater value to the natural as compared to artifacts on the ground that the original is more valuable than the copy. In the light of what Brennan and Elliot hold, Eric Katz goes a step further to derive moral dualism. His view is that nature and artifacts belong to two domains of moral consideration where the former has superior moral standing by virtue of being uncontaminated and natural. For Katz, the problem for the environmental ethics is to determine the moral value of an artifact which is being contaminated and polluted with human intention, purpose, interest etc. It is to be noted that many environmental philosophers and ethicists make an effort to ascribe moral standing to nature. Certain criteria are prescribed for the moral standing of nature. Paul Taylor, J E Lovelock and Tom Reagan, for example consider life as a criterion for moral standing. Others like Andrew Brennan, Aldo Leopold, Holmes Rolston, Baird Callicott refer to intrinsic value as a criterion for moral standing. Lawrence Johnson talks about the interest as the criterion of moral standing where biotic entities as well as holistic entities possess. Katz and Elliott refer to naturalness as a criterion for moral standing. Keeping these criteria in mind, one can determine whether artifacts have any moral standing.

Artifacts which are ontologically dependent on human design, intention and purpose would lack intrinsic value or non-instrumental values because they are designed for human purpose. Further, as Katz argues, since they are contaminated and polluted with human intention, design, labor and technology, they lost their naturalness, therefore lack moral standing. In this manner artifacts are seen as means for human ends and are created for human purpose only. In other words, it implies that an artifact has no intrinsic value which can qualify for moral concern. In this manner Brennan concludes that artifacts will have less moral standing. Hence artifacts cannot be treated at par with natural entities, and as Katz argues, the two belong to two separate domains of moral concern. Katz refers to the Kantian ethics where a moral agent in order to qualify as object of moral concern must be an end and never as a mean. He says that the ethical importance of the distinction between artifacts and natural entities is derived from the anthropocentric nature of artifacts and their reliance on human interest, plans and projects.⁷ In this manner artifacts are always means for human ends. Following Kantian formulation, Katz argues that artifacts being treated as means for some ends can not fit in into the scheme of Categorical Imperative. Katz's argument is that if the categorical imperative is applied to a treatment of artifacts and natural entities we find that artifacts are treated as means, for their existence and value only exist in a dependent relationship with human aims and goals; but natural entities, existing apart from human projects, can be considered as ends-in-themselves⁸. In other words, artifacts cannot be treated as having moral value for they are means for some ends. The ontological dependence of artifacts on humanity is supposed to imply their axiological dependence on the satisfaction of human ends. This is in contrast to the ontological independence of natural entities on humanity which is supposed to imply their axiological independence from the satisfaction of human interest. Hence artifacts can not be included within the scheme of moral concern because they are means for some ends; whereas natural entities possess intrinsic value or naturalness and possessing independent biological identity, and hence are seen as ends in themselves, and therefore can possess moral standing.

⁶ Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects", *Environmental Ethics* 6 (1984) p 35-56

⁷ *Artifacts and Functions*, p. 129

⁸ Katz, *Artifacts and Functions*, p 129.

In other words, natural entities possess moral standing and qualify as objects of moral concern whereas artifacts do not.

As mentioned earlier, for Katz any restoration project makes nature into an artifact because it involves human intention, purpose, uses of technology and so on. This view is reflected also in Elliot's formulation when he talks about faking nature. Elliot holds the view that restoration is analogous to artistic production, and that the original is superior to the copy. This implies that restored- natural entities which involve human interferences are artifacts and have either no moral standing or less moral standing. This is what Katz is trying to specify when he says that nature restoration projects are the creations of human technologies, and as such are artifacts⁹. He further says that the technological fix of nature merely produces artifacts for the satisfaction of human interests¹⁰, for once humans begin to create restored natural environments they impose their anthropocentric purposes on them. Both Elliott and Katz are against the idea of restoration of nature for such project serves as a mean of justifying destructive development. But it can be argued that human interference is not exclusively for anthropocentric purposes, nor does it always amount to 'faking' nature. Katz's view is questioned by practitioners of restoration ecology and also by other environmental ethicists like Holmes Rolston for it only takes the negative aspects of restoration. Restoration has positive dimension meant for restoring nature against deterioration and decay. However, restoration can be interpreted negatively as being destructive. But it is proper to consider only the negative aspect of it for it might not be in the intention of the practitioner to destroy nature but to restore it. This involves proper moral evaluation.

To say that artifacts and nature involve two radically separated domains of moral concern again might involve meta-ethical inquiry where two related things can be evaluated differently. But philosophers like Katz argue that restored-natural entities because they become artifacts are thought to be devoid of moral standing and therefore morally inferior to natural entities. If human restoration project is responsible for the creation of artifacts, it implies that restored-natural entities are morally inferior to natural entities. He says "when we replace the natural world with an artifactual human substitute [i.e. a restored natural world], we also replace a particular complex of values. The new system may appear to be similar to the original natural system, but it will be, in actuality, a human artifact."¹¹ It can also be mentioned that Katz refers to restored-natural entity as a substitution of a morally superior wild nature for a morally inferior entity. In this manner moral value of restored-natural entities are less as compared to that of natural entity. Elliot, for example, is against the idea of 'faking' nature which can be done by the human artifice. Faked-nature is like a copy and therefore different from the original. But Elliot does not admit that any restoration project necessarily amounts to the creation of artifacts.

To consider restored-natural entities as artifacts, in the manner Katz argues is to deny moral consideration to restored-natural entities. If Katz is correct then it will imply that anything which is contaminated with human intention, design and purposes cannot qualify moral consideration. But this view is not intelligible for various reasons. Are humans free from such anthropocentric intervention? This will also have some bearing on the environmental ethics which deals with human relationship with nature. Katz does not intend to say that human intention and purpose are always to be taken as sufficient conditions for the creation of an artifact. He is concern about the employment of technology in our attempt to achieve some purposes. But it can be argued that humans being a part of nature cannot separate themselves from nature. Humans cannot be alienated from nature though their actions can be not in accordance with the natural processes of nature. Our natural environment or nature as a whole is not completely free from human interferences. Humans impose their intention, interests, design, purpose and desires on nature and engage themselves with nature in various ways. If that makes nature into an artifact as Katz holds, or amounts to faking nature, then tribal communities living with nature might have to reconsider their approach. This will have a serious implication on the human-nature relationship. Living with nature and engaging with nature is a sign of

⁹ Katz, "The Big Lie", p.101

¹⁰ Ibid, p114

¹¹ Katz, "The Call of the Wild", p 111

respect and interconnectedness with nature. No doubt, humans create artifacts for meeting certain ends but humans do not intend to make nature into an artifact by participating in it. Similarly, restoration or preservation project may not necessarily make restored-natural entities as artifacts. What is important, to my mind is to make this distinction between creation of artifacts and restoration process so that moral evaluation can be meaningfully applied. Similarly, restoration of nature should not amount to faking nature because faking nature is artificial but restoration of nature is not. Katz takes note of this by referring to 'technological fix' of nature where nature is exploited and abused by humans through the employment of technology. Here what is required is to determine the level of such intervention because minimal intervention might not amount to faking nature or making natural objects as artifacts. Hence to my mind drawing moral dualism on the basis of such dichotomy might not be intelligible. In fact moral evaluation is more concern with human action towards nature or natural entities.

Ethicists who advocate anthropocentrism ascribe moral standing only to humans and therefore claim that we have a moral obligation only towards fellow humans and not to non-humans. Thus humans have no direct duty towards non-humans. Human has a direct duty towards fellow humans and whatever duty that pertains to nature is only indirect. On the other hand those who subscribe to biocentrism or eco-centrism maintain that living entities possess moral standing and therefore ought to be treated for their own sake. To deny moral standing to restored-natural entities is to advocate an anthropocentric paradigm where humans are deciders of what has value.

Ground of nature-artifact dichotomy

As mentioned earlier Aristotle strongly emphasizes on the distinction between nature and artifact. This view was later on adopted by philosophers and aestheticians. The view taken by many is that artifacts are defiant and inferior to that of nature. The rise of a Christian worldview which is further adopted by science tends to treat nature as an object for scientific inquiry and as a mean for human ends. The rise of experimental methodology in science which is more concerned with production than mere explanation puts a question to Aristotelian characterization. Nature turns out to be a raw material for scientific creation of many 'natural' entities. Hence the line between nature and artifacts is blurred and minimized that nature turns out to be the artifact of man. This has a danger of natural entities losing their moral standing and hence moral consideration. It is this concern which makes philosophers like Katz and others to uphold this distinction and recognize its implications.

However, it seems that the dichotomy between nature and artifact does not have a strong foundation and therefore the kind of moral dualism which is derived from it may have the same nature. Usually artifacts are designed and created by humans for certain purposes. But the entire process which is carried out by humans is not something unnatural and outside nature. Humans themselves are very much part of nature and participate in the natural process of nature. The raw materials used are usually that of nature though designed by humans for meeting some purposes. Conventionally we consider what is created by humans for some purposes are artifacts and what exists by itself as natural entity. Aristotle at *Physics* 2.8 shows that nature has design and purpose, that is, natural phenomena are goal-directed and inherently teleological whereas artifacts are created for some purpose and are products of efficient cause. Further, artifacts are derived from nature. Eric Katz even goes to the extent of saying that anything contaminated with human intention, purpose and technology is an artifact. Though he is more concerned about the employment of technology, yet he argues that this is nothing but the imposition human intention, design and purpose for furthering human ends. This in the process involves into fixing of nature or destruction of nature. Is there any part of nature which is free from all these today? Are human creativity and design etc not part of nature? Is human not part of nature and therefore all his or her activities are different from other natural activities? But if humans are part of nature and what they design are derived from nature, then there is no clear demarcation line between natural and artificial because what is created has also certain natural elements. It has become a matter of convention that what is created by humans because it is meant for human purpose is considered as an artifact. We make a distinction between nature and culture and try to attribute the latter to what is man-made or created by human for some purpose. But again such distinction is human-made or conventional which is a product of some intellectual traditions.

The same is true with respect to nature and artifacts. The distinction is only man-made and a matter of convention to differentiate between man-made artifact and natural entities. Hence there is no logical and scientific ground which differentiates artifacts from natural entities.

This raises the issue of identity where one can question whether artifacts are different from nature their material cause. Has the natural object from which an artifact is derived lost its can be asked whether Hence there is no logical ground under which we can differentiate an artifact from nature though we usually do that on some conventional ground or arbitrary characterization. Aristotle tries to present a more scientific account, but fails to address the contemporary issue poses by experimental science. The question that is raised is whether artifacts exist outside nature or signify different modes of representing things. Birds building nest, bees creating beehive, humans developing culture and designing various tools for their own survival. These all take place within nature. In the case of humans we presume that they are endowed with other capacities which other beings do not have. The point that we want to raise is that nature and artifact are not demarcated clearly and logically. We are not very sure how much artifact does nature contain and how much nature does an artifact contain.

What follows therefore, is that a moral dualism which has a ground on the difference between nature and artifact is highly questionable. Those who subscribe to the view that artifacts have less moral standing as compared to nature should provide a more profound basis for their claim. As mentioned above such ground should be clearly differentiated and demarcated. Which should have universal validity. No doubt, such divisions can be made for some practical purposes. The division between human and nature or culture and nature are drawn for certain purposes but not for moral classification. Dichotomizing nature and artifact and denying moral status on artifacts does not seem to be grounded on a strong foundation. To claim that artifacts and nature belong to two different domains of moral concern needs proper moral justification. If restored-natural entities even if they depend on human technology or intention at some period of their growth, but continue to retain their biological autonomy and biological identity thereafter, to my mind cannot be treated as artifacts. Hence a valid criterion and scientific justification is required.

Today we talk about the concept of restoration ecology which is an intentional activity that initiates and accelerates the recovery of an ecosystem from being degraded, damaged or destroyed. Such project involves human intention, purpose, technology etc but obviously, the purpose is to restore or to modify nature. Such project does not intend to restore the original condition of nature but somehow to prepare a condition to allow nature restore or regenerate itself. Restoration is neither a re-creation of nature, nor faking nature. Going by Katz characterization this amounts to making an artifact; and according to Elliott it amounts to 'faking' nature. Both Katz and Elliott are against restoration ecology because it justifies exploitation of nature by humans for meeting some ends. But practitioners of restoration ecology would argue that they do not have the power to create or recreate nature, but simply do their best to help natural processes along. Restoration project works with nature and not against it. In large part, its task consists in clearing the impediments and obstructions to nature rather than in dominating and manipulating it to achieve some human ends. Hence restoration project does not intend to destroy the biological autonomy and biological identity of nature but tries to restore the conditions which help in achieving them. Similarly practitioners of restoration ecology assert that one cannot fake nature because one cannot make nature, but one can do his or her best to help natural process along by restoring the condition that allows nature to restore itself. Katz also acknowledges that remediation of damaged ecosystems is a better policy than letting the blighted landscape remain as it is. But restoration project, the way Katz sees it serves as a mean of justifying destructive development, and as a replacement for natural ecosystems. Nature has its own way of adapting to any environmental conditions and its own way of healing itself. But there is no reason why human can never participate in that system by way of helping to provide some conditions. This is not faking nature nor making it an artifact because restored natural entities retain their biological autonomy and function in accordance to their own telos.

Critical appraisal

Though the dichotomy between nature and artifact can be seen as possible ways of characterizing entities, yet such different characterizations are not sufficient grounds for moral dualism which amounts to denying moral standing to some entities. To equate restored-natural entities with artifacts would amount to denying moral standing to nature as a whole and thereby denying any moral duty toward nature. We classify things into various kinds and differentiating them according to their nature, composition and so on. Accordingly we evaluate them respectively using various criteria of evaluation. But ascribing moral value to different entities on the basis of convention or assumptions may not be appropriate. Restored-natural entities though at some stages might have been objects of human intervention and interferences, yet in the course of time they regain the biological capacity to grow and develop themselves autonomously and retain their biological identity and telos. Restoration process though involves human interference at some stage, yet that does not amount to the loss of biological identity or biological autonomy. Those who claim that restoration of nature is wrong because it will make nature into an artifact have been so disturbed by the idea that any human involvement necessarily amounts to artifacts. We are aware of the argument put forward by practitioners of restoration ecology which emphasizes on restoration of nature and not in destroying it. Destruction of nature is a different kind of action which has different purpose. The purpose of restoration process is to rectify and strengthen the capacities of entities. Such intention and purposes are not anti-environment but for the protection of the environment and therefore is environmentally significant. Restored-natural entities can still retain their biological autonomy and biological identity even after restoration process. Restored-natural entities still maintain their intrinsic value even if at some period of time is dependent on human interference and use of technology. A modified ecosystem is dependent on human intention, value, design etc at some period of time, but that does not mean that they can never function independently later on. A plant depends on human intention and design or even technology at the initial period of its growth, but later on it grows, develops and adapts to any environmental conditions independently in accordance to its own internal capacity and telos. It can be said the restored-natural entities might have their biological autonomy disturbed or violated at some points of time; but if they regain it later on in the process of their growth then we cannot say that they are artifacts. Therefore we cannot deny moral standing to them even if they function in a natural way there-after. As per Aristotle's characterization restored-natural entities despite being temporarily dependent on human intervention could still retain their essential characteristic of having internal principle for change and retaining their biological identity and telos. Having autonomy and being autonomous are different because a person may have autonomy but due to some reasons he or she has the autonomy suppressed or exploited, and therefore not being autonomous at that point of time. In the same manner restored-natural entities might not be autonomous at some stage but that does not mean that they will never regain it later on. If Aristotle's characterization is correct that artifacts must lack the internal capacity to grow, develop and change, it can be argued that restored-natural entities even if they look like artifacts yet they remain natural entities. Paul Taylor, a biologist, says that all living things can be conceived as a "teleological center for life" the internal functions and external activities are all goal-oriented, and having the constant tendency to maintain its existence through time and adapt to the environment. Living entities, therefore, possess biological autonomy to grow and develop in accordance to their own internal capacity and telos. They have the capacity to adapt to their environment and perpetuate themselves and their kinds. In this manner, going by the Aristotle's characterization restored-natural entities are not artifacts. No doubt, restored-natural entities, due to human interference at some period of their life suffer or have their autonomy affected, but later on they regain it. It is a fact that we cannot decide the condition of our birth or place of our birth; but that does not mean that we are not autonomous in life. Technological involvement in our lives have become a matter of necessity, but who are we? Restored-natural entities may require technological involvement at some stage, but still retain their biological capacities. Alastair S Gunn¹² holds that restored-natural entity is not a copy but an original because it is physically continuous with the original through time. This was in response to the claim made by Elliott that restored-natural entity, whether perfectly restored or not is after all a copy rather than a designed entity.

¹² "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environment", *Environmental Ethics* 13(1991), pp 291-309

For him a restored natural entity may lack some relational properties of the formerly undamaged natural entity which includes the properties of being naturally evolved and of having natural continuity with a remote past. But such loss does not amount to the loss of biological identity. A seed may be supported by human technology at the initial stage, but as it grows into a plant it acquires its independent biological autonomy to grow, develop and adapt to the environmental conditions.

Coming back to autonomy, it can be argued that re-stored natural entities might have had its biological autonomy suppressed at some period of their growth, but regain it later on. Such condition should not be the ground for denying moral standing to them. A slave's autonomy got suppressed due to various reasons. But that does not mean that the slave never had it and will never have it at any stage and therefore cannot demand or deserve proper moral treatment. Being autonomous is different from having autonomy and therefore it would be morally befitting to respect suppressed autonomy rather than deny any moral consideration. To deny moral consideration in this case would amount to justifying suppression itself. Further, it would appear absurd not to consider it as a moral duty to respect or help a person whose autonomy is being suppressed. In a similar way if the biological autonomy of natural entities is considered for moral evaluation, there is no logical ground for not considering restored-natural entities. Hence to deny moral standing to them on the ground that they are contaminated with human intention, purpose and design is inappropriate. Morality should consist in doing good rather than seeing what has good.

In lieu of conclusion

It is true that the dichotomy between nature and artifact is conventionally drawn for some purpose. But I do not think that such dichotomy can provide sufficient ground for moral dualism. Katz, at one point of time says that the distinction is to ascertain the difference in value but not for value hierarchy. He holds that if we allow human interference in the functioning of nature for whatever purpose, human will consider that they can interfere with nature and dominate it. Hence by attributing nature and artifact differently we can prevent human from unnecessary interference with nature. The positive aspect of such differentiation is to enable humans to leave nature to itself. This implies that Katz himself is not very clear about what he is up to. We are all against human unnecessary interference with nature for achieving human ends but at the same time we do not want to rule out that we cannot be separated from nature. Hence instead of looking at the negative aspect of such interconnections, I think we can inquire and reflect on what does such interconnectedness can teach us. Awareness of interconnectedness will provide us with some important ecological insights and can impose certain obligations to respect nature as ourselves. Human and nature are closely interconnected that humans will find it difficult to achieve their ends without nature.

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