



SCADA Network Intrusion Detection

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Abstract

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems constitute the critical backbone of modern industrial infrastructure, orchestrating operations in power grids, water treatment facilities, and manufacturing pipelines. As Operational Technology (OT) converges with IT networks (IIoT), these previously isolated systems are increasingly exposed to sophisticated cyber threats. Traditional intrusion detection mechanisms, typically reliant on static signatures, fail to identify novel, zero-day attacks or stealthy anomalies that mimic normal operational behavior. This research proposes a robust, machine learning-driven Intrusion Detection System (IDS) leveraging the Extreme Gradient Boosting (XG-Boost) algorithm to classify high-dimensional SCADA network traffic. To address the "black-box" nature of ensemble models—a significant barrier to adoption in safety-critical environments—we integrate SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) to provide granular, instance-level interpretability. Experimental validation on a dataset of 4,618 SCADA samples demonstrates that the proposed model achieves an accuracy of 95.45% and an attack detection recall of 0.99, significantly outperforming baseline methods. The integration of SHAP further allows security analysts to pinpoint specific sensor features driving each alert, enhancing trust and response efficacy.

Keywords: SCADA Security, Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Intrusion Detection System (IDS), XGBoost, Explainable AI (XAI), SHAP, Cyber-Physical Systems.

1 Introduction

The rapid digitization of industrial infrastructure, often termed Industry 4.0, has led to the widespread deployment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems monitor and control physical processes by collecting data from sensors and sending commands to actuators.

While this connectivity improves efficiency, it introduces critical vulnerabilities. High-profile cyber incidents, such as the Stuxnet worm and the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid, have demonstrated that compromising SCADA networks can lead to catastrophic physical damage, economic loss, and threats to public safety.

Detecting intrusions in SCADA networks presents unique challenges compared to standard IT environments. SCADA traffic is characterized by periodicity and regular communication patterns, yet the volume of data is immense. Attackers increasingly employ "living off the land" techniques, where malicious commands mimic legitimate operational instructions. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) based on predefined signatures are blind to these novel attack vectors.

Machine Learning (ML) offers a promising solution by learning normal behavioral baselines and flagging deviations. However, complex ML models, particularly Deep Neural Networks and Ensemble methods, often lack transparency. In critical infrastructure, a "black-box" prediction is insufficient; operators need to know *why* an alert was raised to verify it and respond appropriately.

This paper presents a unified framework for SCADA security that combines high-performance detection with interpretability. Our contributions are:

1. Development of an XGBoost-based IDS optimized for tabular SCADA logs.
2. Achieving a high recall rate of 99% for attack vectors, minimizing dangerous false negatives.
3. Integration of SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) to interpret model decisions, identifying critical sensors involved in potential breaches.

2 Literature Survey

The evolution of SCADA security has progressed through several distinct paradigms.

Statistical and Rule-Based Approaches

Early research focused on defining static rules for allowed communication protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3). While effective against unauthorized protocol usage, these systems struggle with attacks that encapsulate malicious payloads within valid protocol headers. Statistical approaches attempted to model traffic flow rates, but often generated high false positive rates during legitimate operational spikes.

Machine Learning in IDS

The application of ML to IDS is well-documented. Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Random Forests (RF) have been applied to benchmark datasets like KDD-Cup99. However, Al-Garadi et al. noted that many IoT/SCADA implementations fail to account for the class imbalance inherent in industrial data, where attacks are rare compared to normal traffic. Deep learning models, such as LSTMs and CNNs, have achieved state-of-the-art accuracy in time-series anomaly detection but require significant computational resources, limiting their deployment on edge SCADA devices.

Explainable AI (XAI) in Security

The need for XAI in cybersecurity is growing. Recent studies have utilized LIME (Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations) to interpret malware classifiers. However, LIME approximates local decision boundaries and can be unstable. SHAP, based on game theory, offers consistent feature attribution values and has recently been identified as a superior method for interpreting tree-based ensembles, motivating its selection for this research.

3 Proposed Methodology

The proposed framework follows a pipeline approach: Data Acquisition, Preprocessing, Model Training using Gradient Boosting, and Post-hoc Explanation.

Data Description and Preprocessing

The study utilizes a structured SCADA dataset comprising 4,618 samples. Each sample contains 128 features representing diverse telemetry data, including sensor voltage readings, current measurements, pressure logs, and network packet headers. The dataset is labeled into two classes: *Natural* (Normal Operation) and *Attack* (Intrusion/Anomaly).

Preprocessing steps included:

- **Data Cleaning:** Removal of non-numeric artifacts and handling of missing values via mean imputation.
- **Label Encoding:** The target variable was binary encoded (*Attack*= 0, *Natural*= 1) for compatibility with the classification algorithm.
- **Normalization:** Feature scaling was omitted as tree-based algorithms are invariant to monotonic transformations.

Data Splitting: The dataset was partitioned into 80% training and 20% testing sets using stratified sampling to maintain class distribution.

Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost)

We selected XGBoost due to its scalability and execution speed. Unlike traditional Random Forests which build trees independently, XGBoost builds an ensemble of decision trees sequentially. Each new tree $f_k(x)$ attempts to correct the residual errors of the previous ensemble.

The prediction \hat{y}_i at step t is given by:

$$\hat{y}_i^{(t)} = \sum_{k=1}^t f_k(x_i) = \hat{y}_i^{(t-1)} + f_t(x_i) \quad (1)$$

The objective function used for optimization includes a loss function l and a regularization term Ω :

$$L(\phi) = \sum_i l(\hat{y}_i, y_i) + \sum_k \Omega(f_k) \quad (2)$$

where l is the Logarithmic Loss (LogLoss) for binary classification. The regularization term Ω penalizes model complexity to prevent overfitting, a crucial feature when dealing with high-dimensional SCADA data.

ExplainabilityModel(SHAP)

To interpret the XGBoost model, we employ SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations). SHAP values attribute the prediction output to the contribution of each feature. Based on cooperative

game theory, the SHAP value ϕ_j for feature j is calculated as the weighted average of marginal contributions across all possible feature coalitions:

$$\phi_j(val) = \sum_{S \subseteq \{1, \dots, p\} \setminus \{j\}} (val(S \cup \{j\}) - val(S)) \frac{|S|!(p - |S| - 1)!}{p!} \quad (3)$$



This allows us to visualize which specific sensor readings pushed the model probability toward an "Attack" classification.

4 Experimental Results and Analysis

The proposed system was implemented in Python using the Scikit-learn and XGBoost libraries.

Performance Metrics

The model was evaluated on the held-out test set comprising 924 samples. We prioritize **Recall** (Sensitivity) for the Attack class, as failing to detect an attack (False Negative) is a critical failure in SCADA systems.

The results, as summarized in Table 1, indicate robust performance:

- **Accuracy:** 95.45%
- **Precision(Attack):** 0.96
- **Recall(Attack):** 0.99
- **F1-Score:** 0.97

Table 1: Classification Report for SCADA IDS

Class	Precision	Recall	F1-Score	Support
Attack	0.96	0.99	0.97	719
Natural	0.95	0.84	0.89	205
Overall	0.95	0.95	0.95	924

Confusion Matrix Analysis

The confusion matrix (Fig. 1) reveals that out of 719 actual attack instances, the model successfully detected 709, missing only 10. This results in a False Negative Rate (FNR) of approximately 1.4%, which is highly acceptable for industrial deployment. The 32 False Positives (Natural traffic flagged as Attack) represent a minor operational overhead compared to the risk of missed intrusions.




Figure1:ConfusionMatrix:Highdetectionrate(709/719)forAttackvectors.

SHAPexplainabilityAnalysis

TheSHAPsummaryplot(Fig. 2)illustratestheglobalfeatureimportance. Eachdotrepresents a sample.

- FeatureImportance:** They-axislistsfeaturesindescendingorderofimportance. Featuressuchas*Feature12*and*Feature105*wereidentifiedastheprimarydiscriminators.
- ImpactDirection:** Thecolorrepresentsthefeaturevalue(Red=High,Blue=Low).Forseveraltopfeatures,highvalues(Red)resultinanegativeSHAPvalue,pushingthepredictiontowardsclass0(Attack).Thisinsightallowsoperatorstosetmanualthresholdsonthesespecificsensorsforredundantsafetymonitoring.




Figure2:SHAPBeeswarmPlot: Visualizingtheimpactoftopsensorfeaturesonmodeloutput

5 Conclusion and Future Scope

This paper presented a high-fidelity intrusion detection framework for SCADA systems utilizing XGBoost and SHAP. The experimental results demonstrate that the model achieves near-perfect recall (99%) for attack detection, solving the critical issue of missed alarms in industrial networks. Furthermore, the integration of SHAP transforms the "black-box" model into a transparent tool, providing actionable insights into which physical parameters (features) are indicative of cyber threats.

Future Scope: Future work will focus on:

1. Deploying this model in a Federated Learning environment to preserve data privacy across multiple power plants.
2. Investigating the resilience of the model against Adversarial Machine Learning attacks.
3. Integrating real-time stream processing using Apache Kafka for sub-second latency detection.

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