



# Coalition Politics And Development Policy: State Capacity And Public Service Delivery In Manipur

Yambem Abhinash,

Ph.D. Research Scholar, Department of Political Science,  
Bir Tikendrajit University, Imphal West-795003, Manipur

## Abstract:

This article examines the influence of coalition governance on state capacity and public service delivery in Manipur, India, between 2000 and 2022. The analysis highlights the capacity of dominant parties to maintain policy coherence despite patronage pressures as a key factor shaping service delivery. Congress-dominated coalitions (2000–2017) sustained relatively coherent policy agendas, leading to mixed outcomes in education and infrastructure. In contrast, the post-2017 BJP-led alliances introduced new dynamics of volatility and fragmentation, which were partially offset by increased central support, though often at the expense of need-based allocations. Comparative case studies across sectors demonstrate that coalitions modulate, rather than determine, development outcomes within structural constraints such as fiscal dependence and insurgency. These findings emphasise the significance of stabilising mechanisms for peripheral federal states.

**Keywords:** Coalition politics; State capacity; Manipur development; Public service delivery

## Introduction

While coalition governments are frequently examined for their political stability and longevity, their impact on the state's institutional capacity to deliver public services, formulate coherent development policies, and achieve long-term governance effectiveness has received less scholarly attention (Bergman et al., 2024; Schermann & Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2014). This dimension of governance is particularly salient in peripheral, resource-constrained border states such as Manipur, where institutional capacity is limited and development challenges are pronounced (Mangla, 2015). From 2000 to 2022, coalition governments in Manipur confronted the dual challenge of sustaining alliances among diverse political groups while addressing

persistent deficits in education, health, and infrastructure that affect the state's heterogeneous population (Yumnam, 2024).

This study addresses several key research questions: How do coalition governments in Manipur negotiate policy-making and implementation among partners with divergent interests and constituencies? Does the nature of coalition governance—majority versus minority, stable versus volatile—correlate with development outcomes and institutional state capacity for service delivery? How did the transition from Congress-led to BJP-led coalitions influence development policy priorities and resource allocation across sectors? To what extent did state capacity for service delivery depend on coalition stability, central government support, and bureaucratic effectiveness?

The central argument posits that coalition governance in Manipur produced differentiated development outcomes across two distinct periods. During the Congress-dominated era (2000–2017), secure electoral control enabled cabinets to prioritise coherent policy agendas and access central development funds, despite pressures from coalition partners. Descriptive statistics indicate consistent improvements in public service infrastructure, particularly in health. However, attributing these gains solely to policy coherence is complicated by the influence of central government initiatives (India Today NE, 2024). In the subsequent period (post-2017), increased coalition competition and reliance on unpredictable partners led to greater pursuit of constituency-specific patronage, even as key health indicators remained below WHO and IPHS standards (Yumnam, 2024). While the correlation between coalition dynamics and patronage-driven allocations is evident, establishing causality requires further case-specific analysis. Th

### **Conceptual Framework**

Coalition governance refers to the process by which coalition partners negotiate, design, and implement policies that affect populations and constituencies. Key dimensions include policy coordination, defined as the extent to which coalition partners share policy agendas versus maintain conflicting priorities, portfolio allocation among partners, veto powers, and patronage distribution mechanisms (Mofokeng et al., 2024; Bergman et al., 2024). The alignment of policy agendas can be measured by the percentage of shared policy initiatives among coalition partners, while the distribution of ministerial roles assesses portfolio allocation. Veto powers are observed through the frequency of policy rejections by coalition members, and patronage distribution is tracked by the percentage of public spending directed to coalition constituencies (Bäck et al., 2016, pp. 574–591). Quantifying these dimensions enables a more precise evaluation of the risks of policy incoherence and patronage-focused governance.

State capacity refers to the institutional ability of government to formulate, implement, and sustain effective policies over time and across electoral cycles. Its key dimensions include administrative capacity (bureaucratic quality, professionalism, and implementation effectiveness), fiscal capacity (the ability to raise and allocate resources for public services), policy coherence (consistency and clarity of development

priorities), and institutional autonomy (the degree to which policy-making is insulated from narrow political pressures and short-term partisan interests) (Mangla, 2015; Roy et al., 2018). State capacity is dynamic and can be strengthened or weakened by political decisions, including the manner in which coalitions distribute authority among ministers and implementing agencies (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020). Coalition politics influences state capacity primarily through the dynamics of party patronage, which serves as a linkage mechanism between political parties and the executive.

### **State Capacity and Development Context in Manipur**

Before 2000, Manipur faced substantial development challenges: low literacy rates across the state, weak health infrastructure and service delivery, limited industrialisation and economic diversification, and low human development indicators compared to national averages, as well as infrastructure gaps in rural and urban areas (Yumnam, 2024; IDSA, 2024). These challenges predate the period under study and were not caused by coalition politics per se, but rather reflect historical development patterns and central neglect of peripheral northeastern states in India's federal structure (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024; Mangla, 2015).

Sources of state capacity constraint include exogenous factors—remoteness and geographic isolation, small population base limiting resource mobilisation, insurgency diverting budgets to security spending, limited natural resource endowment, national fiscal disparities—and endogenous factors including bureaucratic capacity limitations, institutional efficiency deficits, political will constraints, and limited local resource mobilisation capacity (Gupta, 2015). Central government support, conveyed through fiscal transfers and scheme implementation, is essential to Manipur's development, as state revenue generation is limited (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024). Coalition governments must navigate central government priorities while pursuing state-level agendas. Alignment between central and state governments (e.g., a Congress-led centre with a Congress state, or a BJP-led centre with a BJP state) significantly shapes flows of development funds and implementation capacity (Gupta, 2015).

Development challenges that coalition governments had to address included education (low literacy, limited school infrastructure, gender gaps in enrollment), health (limited hospital beds, high maternal/infant mortality, limited rural access to services), infrastructure (inadequate roads, electricity access, water supply coverage), economic development (limited employment, agricultural stagnation, lack of industrialization), and local governance (weak Panchayati raj institution) (Education for All in India, 2023; Yumnam, 2024). Manipur ranked fourth among eight northeastern states in NITI Aayog's Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) ranking, with 89% of districts in the performer category (score: 50–64) for SDG 3 (good health and well-being) (NITI Aayog, 2025; Yumnam, 2024). These outcome variables provide the basis for evaluating the effects of coalition governance on state capacity and development delivery.

## Coalition Governance and Development Policy, 2000–2017: Congress-Anchored Stability

Congress-led coalition cabinets, 2000–2017, were typically composed of Congress ministers supplemented by regional party and independent representatives. Congress retained dominant ministerial positions (finance, development, education, health); coalition partners received ministerial posts reflecting coalition bargains negotiated before government formation. Unlike competitive coalitions, Congress partners possessed limited ability to veto policies or demand significant reorientations or priority shifts because of Congress's electoral dominance and secure legislative backing (Dev, 2024).

Education policy during this period reflected Congress's priorities, such as expanding school enrollment through various initiatives, implementing the Mid-Day Meal Scheme—which began in Manipur in November 1995 and was developed to provide cooked food in all government and aided primary schools from November 2004 as per Supreme Court directives—and conducting teacher recruitment (Government of Manipur, n.d.). School enrollment showed an increase, as demonstrated by a 31.6% rise in female enrolment in higher education since 2014–15, but gender parity gaps in enrollment and completion rates persisted; coalition governments pursued relatively coherent education agendas because Congress dominated the education ministry and had sufficient support to resist particularistic partner demands for constituency-specific resource allocations (Government of India, n.d.). However, teacher recruitment patterns suggest some coalition influence: allocation of teachers sometimes reflected coalition partners' regional bases.

Health policy showed moderate investment in hospital infrastructure expansion and health worker recruitment initiatives during this period. Maternal mortality declined gradually but remained above national averages, with Manipur reporting particularly high out-of-pocket expenditure (Rs. 6,452) for institutional childbirth in government facilities—the highest in the country (Yumnam, 2024). The Manipur health ministry, often led by coalition partners, demonstrated varying levels of commitment to health objectives and standards during the period studied. In certain instances, health ministries within coalition governments placed greater emphasis on constituency development than on prioritising state-level health goals, contributing to diminished policy coherence (Yumnam, 2024). However, Congress's fiscal control limited partners' ability to radically reorient health spending away from programmatic priorities, as reflected in Manipur's allocation of 5.4% of its total expenditure to health, which is below the ave

Infrastructure development—roads, electricity, water supply—proceeded unevenly during 2000–2017, reflecting coalition dynamics and patterns of central support. Major infrastructure projects (highways, state capital infrastructure) showed continuity despite coalition changes, suggesting that strategic infrastructure escaped coalition influence and followed central planning frameworks. However, local infrastructure allocation (roads, village water schemes) sometimes reflected coalition partners' geographic bases, with partners seeking to direct funds toward their constituencies (Gupta, 2015). This pattern suggests that



coalition governments, despite Congress's dominance, did employ patronage distribution to maintain coalition stability, though within broader development frameworks set by Congress (Dev, 2024).

Panchayati Raj institutions remained weak during this period, which limited community participation in development planning and implementation. Coalition governments did not substantially strengthen local government institutions; instead, they preferred to allocate spending through state ministries. While this pattern was consistent with national trends, coalition dynamics played a causal role by providing incentives for state-level actors to avoid decentralising authority; if local governance were strengthened, coalition partners would face reduced capacity to channel patronage to their preferred constituencies. Thus, the weakness of Panchayati Raj institutions was not only a reflection of broader national tendencies but was also actively perpetuated by the political calculations of coalition partners seeking to maintain control over resource allocation (Mangla, 2015).

Congress's electoral dominance allowed cabinets to maintain relatively broad development agendas despite coalition pressures from partners. While patronage distribution (funding coalition partners' areas) did occur, Congress's secure position meant it could also prioritise state-level development priorities without being held hostage by coalition partners. Development outcomes were mixed: improvements in some areas, such as school enrollment rising from 62% to 78% between 2000 and 2012, and infrastructure coverage expanding, but persistent gaps remained. Health outcomes improved more slowly than national averages, as seen in the decline in India's maternal mortality rate from 437 per one lakh live births in 1992–93 to 178 in 2010–12, indicating that while progress was made, challenges in health and industrial development persisted (Government of India, n.d.; The Indian Express, 2023). Coalition governance was not the primary driver of development outcomes; Congress-dominated stability allowed consistent (if

### **Coalition Governance and Development Policy, 2017–2022: Competitive Coalitions and Policy Shifts**

Cabinet composition shifted substantially across governments post-2017. Congress coalition composition changed incrementally through mid-2017, but Congress retained dominance of key ministries until 2017. However, the 2017 BJP-led coalition represented fundamental change: BJP assumed dominance previously held by Congress for a decade and a half. New coalition partners (NPP, NPF) held significant ministerial portfolios, including development-related ministries. BJP retained control of finance, home, and core development portfolios; regional partners influenced but did not determine policy direction (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024).

Education policy under the BJP coalition reflected different priorities compared to the earlier Congress-led period. BJP emphasises national curriculum frameworks, Sanskrit language instruction, and nationalist history narratives in school curricula. Some implementation challenges emerged as state education bureaucracy adjusted to central BJP curriculum directives and expectations from central organisations. School enrollment continued to expand gradually, and literacy improved, with Manipur's literacy rate rising

from 66.6% in 2001 to 79.21% in 2011, though more recent data specific to the post-2017 period is needed to fully assess the impact of these changes (Manipur News, 2011). Still, some analyses suggest that increased focus on nationalist content may have affected curriculum breadth and diversity in some areas (NABARD, n.d.; The Arunachal Times, 2025).

Health policy received enhanced central support post-2014 through central health schemes (Ayushman Bharat, Pradhan Mantri health insurance initiatives). It increased central allocations to northeastern states, which increased from approximately 29,000 crores annually (2014–2017) to well above 90,000 crores in recent years (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024; The Sentinel Assam, 2023). Hospital infrastructure expanded more rapidly during 2014–2022 than during 2000–2014, indicating improved investment levels and central support reaching the state level. However, coalition dynamics still affected implementation: the health ministry's allocation to coalition partners sometimes led to hospital construction in specific constituencies, raising questions about whether allocations were need-based or patronage-driven (Yumnam, 2024). Despite central support, health outcomes—maternal mortality, infant mortality—improved at similar or slower rates than the 2000–2012 period, suggesting that coalition patronage dynamics may have co

Infrastructure development accelerated post-2014, particularly central-funded projects (highways, rail connectivity), reflecting increased central investment frameworks and “Act East Policy” emphasis on Northeast connectivity. However, allocation patterns suggest coalition influence: development allocations were disproportionately favoured by the constituencies of coalition partners. While central support enhanced fiscal capacity for larger projects, coalition dynamics fragmented allocation patterns away from need-based distribution. Local infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) showed improved coverage, but spatial distribution reflected coalition partner interests and negotiating positions (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024).

Central government alignment with state coalition (BJP centre supporting BJP state coalition) enhanced development fund flows significantly through increased transfers and scheme implementation, but potentially compromised state autonomy in priority-setting. Central schemes have sometimes required that states implement centrally determined priorities, which can reduce state flexibility and autonomy in adapting programs to local contexts; for instance, the Watershed Development Project in Shifting Cultivation Areas was carried out in the Northeast Region, with states mandated to assign horticulture or soil conservation as the nodal department for implementation. Whether these arrangements result in genuine development benefits or represent the subordination of state interests to central agendas remains a matter of debate among observers of Northeast development (TERI, 2022; Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024).

Coalition volatility introduced implementation risks, as coalition governments in Manipur sometimes faced partner defections or withdrawals that disrupted ongoing development programs during execution. Furthermore, in some cases, the allocation of infrastructure projects and related benefits was strategically used to manage coalition dynamics and secure support from threatened partners (Bishamber & Devi, 2022;

Mofokeng et al., 2024). This dynamic potentially compromised the coherence of need-based allocation patterns and long-term development planning (Bergman et al., 2024).

**Synthesis:** Competitive coalitions under BJP leadership generated distinct development dynamics compared to those under the Congress. Enhanced central support for the state coalition, facilitated by the BJP's alignment at the centre, led to significant improvements in infrastructure, increased capacity to implement central schemes, and higher inflows of development funds. A substantial proportion of Manipur's development budget during this period originated from centrally sponsored schemes; for instance, government reports indicate that these schemes accounted for approximately 60% of the total state budget, highlighting a pronounced dependence on central transfers (The Indian Express, 2022). However, coalition volatility and partner leverage sometimes led to the strategic distribution of development initiatives to manage coalition dynamics, as partners sought projects in exchange for continued support. Consequently, the impact on state capacity was mixed. While central funding enhanced fiscal capacity, fragmentation o

#### Analytical Synthesis: Coalition Politics and State Capacity

Policy coherence varied notably across the periods studied. During the Congress-dominated coalition era (2000–2017), Congress defined development agendas within an overarching structure that balanced coalition partners' interests with foundational state priorities. In contrast, the period from 2017 to 2022 witnessed the emergence of more competitive, BJP-led coalitions. Although the existing evidence centres primarily on health policy changes, it does not offer a comprehensive analysis of how the transition to BJP-led competitive alliances affected the consistency or transformation of overall development priorities. This evidentiary gap limits precise determination of whether increased coalition competition directly contributed to fragmentation or continuity in broader policy agendas, underscoring the need for more explicit evaluation of the impact of coalition dynamics on policy coherence during this subsequent period (Yumnam, 2024).

The balance between patronage and development shifted significantly between these periods. During the Congress period, patronage was subject to greater constraints, allowing development policies to align more closely with the party in power's priorities. In contrast, the BJP period was marked by heightened political contestation and volatility, with documented instances of coalition dynamics leading to strategic allocation of development projects to maintain government stability (Yumnam, 2024). Although there were also allegations regarding the Congress's association with Kuki-Zo organisations and their call for President's Rule (PTI, 2024), there is limited empirical evidence connecting these political developments directly to measurable changes in education enrollment or health indicators. The existing data indicate that outcomes in these domains are shaped by a combination of factors, including economic growth, central policy interventions, and demographic changes, suggesting that no single causal pathway

Central support did not necessarily enhance coalition viability and development outcomes in Manipur, as the Congress-led state government was held responsible for hampering the state's development during its

tenure (Government of India, 2017). BJP-led centre (2014+) and BJP state coalition: more substantial alignment; more development funds reached the state level, but central priorities (security, nationalism) potentially constrained state autonomy (Rymbai & Thangkhiew, 2024; Kapoor, 2025). The mandatory 10% budget allocation to northeastern states increased significantly, providing more resources but with central conditionality.

Bureaucratic autonomy and coalition pressure affected the implementation's effectiveness. Congress leaders have criticised the BJP-led alliance's efforts to form a government in Manipur, questioning its legitimacy and alleging that it was influenced by civil society pressure rather than reflecting a genuine democratic mandate ("Congress slams BJP's move," 2025). The understaffed bureaucracy of India—with the smallest number of bureaucrats per capita among G-20 peers—constrained capacity across all periods, though coalition effects modulated how scarce capacity was allocated (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020).

Long-term state capacity trajectory, 2000–2022: Coalitions did not dramatically enhance or degrade state capacity overall in Manipur. Institutional mechanisms for development improved modestly through enhanced central support and schemes; development indicators show mixed progress—some sectors (education access, infrastructure coverage, literacy rates) expanded substantially, persistent gaps remain (health outcomes, industrial development, out-of-pocket expenditure burden) (Yumnam, 2024). Coalition governance influenced the design and implementation of development policy in Manipur, affecting decision-making processes but not causing dramatic shifts in policy outcomes (Bishamber & Devi, 2022, pp. 1–10).

## Conclusion

Coalition governance in Manipur manifested distinct operational patterns across the two periods analysed (Bishamber & Devi, 2022, pp. 1–10). Congress's dominance (2000–2017) allowed cabinets to maintain policy coherence and pursue broad development agendas despite coalition pressures; development outcomes were mixed, with improvements in access but persistent gaps in quality and outcomes. Competitive coalitions (2017–2022) introduced greater volatility and fragmentation in allocation patterns, though enhanced central support (BJP centre backing BJP state) partially offset these risks by increasing absolute resource flows. Development outcomes in Manipur have shown ongoing improvements, particularly in education enrolment and infrastructure, while notable disparities persist in health outcomes and industrial development (Yumnam, 2024). Coalition governance did not serve as the principal factor behind either developmental progress or setbacks; rather, it influenced how development policies were formulated and

In the coalition governance literature, coalitions do not uniformly degrade policy coherence; rather, the impact depends on factors such as coalition stability, dominant-party capacity, and the presence of central support mechanisms (Bergman et al., 2024). For state capacity studies, coalition volatility can undermine state capacity by fragmenting cabinet coherence and bureaucratic autonomy, though central support can



partially compensate by increasing absolute resource flows (Mangla, 2015; Dev, 2024). For development studies, linking coalition governance to development outcomes requires empirical attention to specific policy areas, longitudinal data on service delivery patterns, and isolation of coalition effects from other determinants (Yumnam, 2024).

Future research should include quantitative analyses using regression discontinuity or interrupted time-series methods to isolate coalition effects on specific development indicators. This approach could directly inform policy decisions, such as revising grant allocation formulas to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources. For instance, identifying the exact thresholds at which coalition characteristics significantly impact development outcomes could provide valuable insights for tailoring grant formulas to better align with coalition dynamics. Comparative studies of development outcomes across Northeast states with different coalition dynamics and patterns of coalition stability; in-depth case studies of particular policy implementation across coalition government transitions (education, health); and a longitudinal study of state capacity indicators in relation to coalition composition and stability throughout electoral cycles are also essential. Such analysis would clarify the mechanisms through

## References

1. Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P. (2016). The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach. *European Journal of Political Research*, 55(3), 574–591. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12116>
2. Bergman, E., Angelova, M., Bäck, H., & Müller, W. C. (2024). Coalition agreements and governments' policy-making productivity. *West European Politics*, 47(1), 31–60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2161794>
3. Bishamber, & Devi, T. S. (2022). Impact of Coalition Politics on Indian Governance. *ShodhKosh: Journal of Visual and Performing Arts*, 3(2), 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.29121/shodhkosh.v3.i2.2022.137>
4. Congress slams BJP's move to form government in Manipur, calls it unconstitutional. (2025, March 14). *The Hindu*. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/congress-slams-bjps-move-to-form-government-in-manipur-calls-it-unconstitutional/article65222384.ece>
5. Dasgupta, A., & Kapur, D. (2020). The political economy of bureaucratic overload: Evidence from rural development officials in India (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 3057602). Social Science Research Network. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057602>
6. Dev, S. (2024, June 18). An inquiry into the decay of India's state capacity at the local level. *The Nirvik*. <https://www.thenirvik.com/more/an-inquiry-into-the-decay-of-indias-state-capacity-at-the-local-level/>

7. Education for All in India. (2023). *An analysis of the literacy rate & dropout rates in North-Eastern India & potential improvement solutions*. <https://educationforallinindia.com/literacy-dropout-rates-in-north-eastern-india/>
8. Government of India. (n.d.). *Educational Statistics*. Ministry of Education. <https://www.education.gov.in/>
9. Government of India. (2017). *Press Information Bureau*. <https://pib.gov.in/>
10. Government of Manipur. (n.d.). *Mid Day Meal Scheme*. Department of Education (Schools). <https://manipur.gov.in/>
11. Gupta, A. (2015). Central assistance to North Eastern States: A comparative analysis (MPRA Paper No. 68904). Munich Personal RePEc Archive. <https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/68904/>
12. IDSA. (2024). *Educated unemployment and insurgency in Manipur: Issues and recommendations*. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. <https://www.idsa.in/publisher/policybrief/educated-unemployment-and-insurgency-in-manipur-issues-and-recommendations>
13. India Today NE. (2024, November 21). Manipur secures Rs 104.66 crore boost for hill district healthcare. <https://www.indiatodayne.in/manipur/story/manipur-secures-rs-10466-crore-boost-for-hill-district-healthcare-1124448-2024-11-21>
14. Kapoor, A. (2025, May 2). Looking beyond Assam. *Institute for Competitiveness*. <https://competitiveness.in/looking-beyond-assam/>
15. Mangla, A. (2015). Bureaucratic norms and state capacity in India: Implementing primary education in the Himalayan region. *Asian Survey*, 55(5), 882–908.
16. Manipur News. (2011, April 2). Manipur Census 2011 (Provisional). <https://www.manipur.org/news/2011/04/02/manipur-census-2011-provisional/>
17. Mofokeng, S., Ramolobe, S. K., & Bogopa, D. (2024). The complexities of coalition governments on service delivery in the South African local government. *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives*, 9(2), 53–66.
18. NABARD. (n.d.). *State Focus Paper 2023-24: Manipur*. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. <https://www.nabard.org/>
19. NITI Aayog. (2025, July 7). NITI Aayog releases 2nd NER District SDG Index; Mizoram's Hnahthial tops Northeast. *Virthli*. <https://www.virthli.in/2025/07/niti-aayog-releases-2nd-ner-district.html>
20. PTI. (2024, November 18). Manipur violence: Congress asks PM Modi to visit state, demands Amit Shah's resignation. *The Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/manipur-violence-congress-asks-pm-modi-to-visit-state-demands-amit-shahs-resignation/articleshow/115418873.cms>

21. Roy, S., Shah, A., Srikrishna, B. N., & Sundaresan, S. (2018). *Building state capacity for regulation in India*. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. [https://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/PDF/RSSS\\_building-state-capacity.pdf](https://macrofinance.nipfp.org.in/PDF/RSSS_building-state-capacity.pdf)
22. Rymbai, M. S., & Thangkhiew, D. W. (2024). Fiscal conundrum of the North-Eastern states of India. *The Indian Economic Journal*, 72(4), 623–640.
23. Schermann, K., & Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). Coalition policy-making under constraints: Examining the role of preferences and institutions. *West European Politics*, 37(3), 564–583. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.841069>
24. TERI. (2022). *Sustainable Development in the North Eastern Region of India*. The Energy and Resources Institute. <https://www.teriin.org/>
25. The Arunachal Times. (2025, May 24). 5 NE states are among the top 10 states with the highest literacy rate; Arunachal is 21st. <https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2025/05/24/5-ne-states-among-top-10-states-with-highest-literacy-rate-arunachal-21st/>
26. The Indian Express. (2022, December 4). Manipur: Nearly Rs 890 crore funds for centrally sponsored schemes remain unutilised. <https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/manipur/890-crore-funds-centrally-sponsored-schemes-unutilised-8305739/>
27. The Indian Express. (2023, January 18). Student enrolment increases in govt schools in Manipur: ASER 2022. <https://indianexpress.com/article/education/student-enrolment-increases-in-govt-schools-in-manipur-aser-2022-8390279/>
28. The Sentinel Assam. (2023, July 25). 55 ministries allocate Rs 94,679 crore for Northeast. <https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/55-ministries-allocate-rs-94679-crore-for-northeast-659804>
29. Yumnam, V. (2024). Manipur's journey towards the health SDGs: What's achieved and what more is needed? *Indian Journal of Community Medicine*, 49(1), 18–21. [https://doi.org/10.4103/ijcm.ijcm\\_196\\_23](https://doi.org/10.4103/ijcm.ijcm_196_23)